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ARTICLES
BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD:
RE-EXAMINING ACCEPTED PREMISES
OF REGIONAL CIRCUIT STRUCTURE
Martha Dragich*
I. INTRODUCTION

Regional boundaries have defined the lower federal courts
since their inception. But the federal courts have changed
markedly in the intervening years in terms of the jurisdiction,
staffing, and role of each tier within the federal judicial system.
Today, the courts of appeals are almost always the end of the
line for litigants.' The only path to review by the Supreme Court
is discretionary, and the Court takes only a minute fraction of
the cases in which certiorari petitions are filed.2 The balance of
* James S. Rollins Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law. The author
appreciates the assistance of Lydia Palmer Sage (2012); the University of Missouri Law
Library staff, especially Cindy Shearrer; and Dean Larry Dessem and the University of
Missouri Law Foundation. All errors are mine.
1. Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal

Courts, 1996 Wis. L. Rev. 11, 24.
2. In 2008, for example, there were 8,966 cases on the Supreme Court's docket.
Eighty-seven cases were argued during the 2008 Term; eighty-three were decided by full
opinion and another ninety-five were reviewed and decided without oral argument.
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, JudicialBusiness of the U.S. Courts, http://www.

.uscourts.gov /Statistics/Judicial Business/Judicial Business.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/
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cases in federal courts today is heavily weighted toward cases
involving federal law.3 Cases involving application of state law

have steadily declined as a fraction of federal court caseloads.4
Accordingly, it would seem that the federal courts should be
structured to promote reasonable uniformity of decision on
questions of federal law.
Paradoxically, the geographic organization of the federal
courts seems to privilege regional over national concerns and
may render these courts ill-suited to promote uniform
interpretation of federal law. The courts of appeals function as
largely independent adjudicatory bodies.5 The regional structure
of the courts of appeals, together with the "law of the circuit"
doctrine, values intra-circuit consistency and tolerates
considerable inter-circuit conflict.6 The result is a systemic lack
of capacity for uniform development of federal law.
The experience of recent decades suggests that political
will is lacking to undertake a broad restructuring of the courts of
appeals that involves either adding appellate courts or departing
altogether from the concept of regional organization. Congress
Judicial Business/2009/appendices/AO1SepO9.pdf (2009) (tbl. A-1); see also Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1178-79 (1989)

(noting that Supreme Court reviews an "insignificant proportion" of all cases decided by
the federal district courts and courts of appeals).
3. In the year ending March 31, 2010, the federal courts of appeals (excepting the
Federal Circuit) reviewed 44,255 cases, of which 20,505 were federal-question cases,
13,065 were criminal cases, and 7,626 involved the United States as defendant.
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, FederalJudicial CaseloadStatistics, http://www

.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2010
/tables/BO7MarlO.pdf (Mar. 31, 2010) (tbl. B-7).
4. In the year ending March 31, 2010, 2,623 of 44,255 cases (5.9 percent) in the courts
of appeals were diversity cases. Id. By contrast, in 1950, 563 of 1,822 cases (30.9 percent)
in the courts of appeals were diversity cases. Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, Annual Report of the Directorfor the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1950 at 137

(1950). In 1890, when Congress was debating creation of the federal courts of appeals, one
Member of Congress noted that "[miore than one-half of all the business now on the docket
of the Supreme Court and the inferior courts of the United States springs from
controversies between citizens of different states." 21 Cong. Rec. 3405 (1890) (remarks of
Rep. Culberson).
5. Martha Dragich, Uniformity, Inferiority, and the Law of the Circuit Doctrine, 56

Loy. L. Rev. 535, 538 (2010); Martha Dragich Pearson, Citation of Unpublished Opinions
as Precedent, 55 Hastings L.J. 1235, 1268-70 (2004).
6. Dragich, Uniformity, supra n. 5, at 538.

7. See generally Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
Appeals, Final Report, http://www.library.unt.edulgpo/csafca/final/appstruc.pdf (Dec. 18,
1998) [hereinafter White Commission Report]. (The Commission on Structural Alternatives
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has acted rarely and cautiously in response to excessive
caseloads. Beginning in 1929, when it carved the new Tenth
Circuit out of the former Eighth Circuit,8 Congress chose intracircuit reform over system-wide adjustments. Since the split of
the Eleventh Circuit from the former Fifth Circuit in 19809 and
the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982,10 the only structural
reform measure enacted was a significant increase in authorized
judgeships in 1990.11 Following that expansion of the federal
judiciary, circuit judges themselves have debated the merits of
any further expansion.12 Yet calls for reform are persistent, even
though continuing to regard the existing regional boundaries as
sacrosanct makes meaningful reform that preserves federal
appellate justice in its traditional form difficult to imagine.
This article aims to determine which of the accepted
structural features of the courts of appeals are essential by
demonstrating that the federal courts are designed to assure the
supremacy and uniformity of federal law, and that regional
organization was intended to foster, not to negate, uniformity.
And it identifies and evaluates specific entrenched ideas about
circuit structure.
for the Federal Courts of Appeals is also known as the "White Commission," for its Chair,
retired Justice Byron White.)
8. Act of Feb. 28, 1929, ch. 363, § 1, 45 Stat. 1346, 1346-47 (currently codified in
28 U.S.C. § 41 (2011)) (available at http://uscode.house.gov). The Eighth Circuit was
divided in 1929 and a new Tenth Circuit, consisting of approximately half the states of the
former Eighth Circuit, plus New Mexico, was created. A separate circuit was created for
the District of Columbia in 1948. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 41, 62. Stat. 869, 870
(also currently codified in 28 U.S.C. §41).
9. Fifth Circuit Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994
(currently codified in 28 U.S.C. § 41). The Fifth Circuit was split in 1980, with three states
plus the District of the Canal Zone remaining in the Fifth Circuit and three others making
up the new Eleventh Circuit. Id.
10. Act of Apr. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. The new Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit was created in 1982 and, unlike the other circuits, was organized by
subject matter, drawing cases from all districts. 96 Stat. at 37-38 (now codified in 28
U.S.C. § 41) (establishing the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit).
11. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 202-06, 104 Stat.
5089, 5098-104 (Dec. 1, 1990) (titled "An act to provide for the appointment of additional
Federal circuit and district judges, and for other purposes").
12. Compare, for example, Jon 0. Newman, Litigation Reforms and the Dangers of
Growth of the FederalJudiciary, 70 Temp. L. Rev. 1125, 1128-30 (1977) (cautioning

against further expansion of the federal judiciary) with Stephen Reinhardt, Surveys without
Solutions: Another Study of the United States Courts of Appeals, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1505,

1515 (1995) (calling for significant expansion of the federal judiciary).
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Thus, this article considers the Hruska Commission'sl 3
articulated (but largely unexplained) criteria, 14 which hold that
(1) circuits should be composed of at least three
states; (2) no circuit should be created that would
immediately require more than nine judges; (3) a
circuit should contain states with a diversity of
population, legal business, and socioeconomic
interests; (4) realignment should avoid excessive
interference in established circuit alignment; and
(5) no circuit should contain noncontiguous
states. 15
This article also assesses the additional, widely accepted
criterion that no state should be split between two or more
circuits,1 and concludes that these criteria have hindered
attempts to accommodate the growing appellate caseload by
restructuring the courts of appeals in a manner calculated to
provide for reasonably uniform interpretation of federal law." It
13. The Commission, chaired by Senator Roman Hruska, produced two reports. See
Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, The Geographical
Boundaries of the Several Judicial Circuits: Recommendationsfor Change, 62 F.R.D. 223
(1973) [hereinafter GeographicalBoundaries];see also Commission on Revision of the
Federal Court Appellate System, Structure and InternalProcedures:Recommendationsfor

Change, 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975) [hereinafter Structure].
14. Geographical Boundaries, supra n. 13, at 231-32 (describing, without citation,
"several important criteria").
15. Thomas E. Baker, RationingJustice on Appeal: The Problems of the U.S. Courts of
Appeals 56 (West Pub. Co. 1994) (referring to "self-imposed criteria" applied by the
Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System in 1973 in connection
with its study of the old Fifth Circuit). This article uses the following terms to refer to these
five criteria: the "three-state" principle, the "nine-judge" principle, the "diversity of
business" principle, the "minimal disruption" principle, and the "contiguity" principle.
16. See e.g. Arthur D. Hellman, Legal Problems of Dividing a State Between Federal
JudicialCircuits, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1188 (1974); but see GeographicalBoundaries,supra

n. 13, at 238-40 (concluding that "[d]ividing the judicial districts of California between
two circuits raises no insoluble or unmanageable problems"). The present article refers to
the principle that no state should be split between circuits as the "whole-state" criterion.
17. Efforts to split the Ninth Circuit in particular have foundered on these notions. See
e.g. White Commission Report, supra n. 7, at 29-57. The Commission proposed to divide

the Ninth Circuit into administrative divisions, with California split between the divisions,
rather than to split the circuit, citing disruption and cost of a circuit split. Id Other
proposals regarding the Ninth Circuit have also focused on finding a way to restructure that
court within its current geographic boundaries. For various reasons, including the fact that
cases from California so significantly dominate the Ninth Circuit's docket, none of the bills
introduced in Congress has been enacted. Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit has implemented
extensive "intramural" reforms, see e.g. Baker, supra n. 15, at 78-83, 106-85 (discussing
"administrative innovations" in Ninth Circuit and both adopted and proposed "intramural
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includes an argument that these criteria are generally
outmoded, tracing their origin to earlier courts bearing little
resemblance to the current courts of appeal, and notes that the
criteria are also internally inconsistent.
But it also acknowledges that some of the entrenched
criteria remain meaningful determinants of circuit structure
given the contemporary role and function of the federal courts of
appeals: The three-state and diversity-of-business principles
preserve the generalist tradition of the federal courts and
promote uniformity of federal law, at least weakly. They could
be strengthened if Congress were to consolidate some circuits.
The whole-state criterion does little to promote uniformity in
federal law but does protect uniformity of state law. Given the
shift from diversity cases to federal question cases, this
consideration is of diminishing importance as a determinant of
the structure of the federal courts of appeals. The contiguity
criterion has lost relevance given changes in the demographics,
economies, and other characteristics of individual states. At the
same time, the contiguity criterion may be in tension with the
diversity-of-business principle.
Inconsistency and obsolescence notwithstanding, the
accepted criteria continue to dominate the discussion because
structural criteria interact with the decisional structures of the
courts of appeals. Decisions are rendered by panels of three
judges.2 0 En banc decisions are rare; many question the
effectiveness of this mechanism in maintaining intra-circuit
consistency of decision.2 1 Panels are bound to follow prior panel
reforms" across the federal appellate system), which have themselves generated
considerable controversy. Other circuits have adopted similar strategies to varying degrees,
often at the urging of the Judicial Conference. Baker, supra n. 15, at 106-185 (discussing
adopted and proposed intramural reforms).
18. The most obvious example is the nine-judge criterion, which has been abandoned
as infeasible, even if ideal. See generally White Commission Report, supra n. 7, at 29-30

(discussing advantages of smaller courts but acknowledging that courts of more than nine
members are inevitable); see also Charles Alan Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A
Crisis in Judicial Administration, 42 Tex. L. Rev. 949, 968-73 (1964) (discussing court
size); Deborah J. Barrow & Thomas G. Walker, A Court Divided: The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals and the Politics of Judicial Reform 2-7 (Yale U. Press 1988) (discussing the

"rule of nine" in context of the struggle to divide the Fifth Circuit).
19. See infra Parts III(C) and III(D).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
21. See e.g. Dragich, supran. 1, at 33-34, 34 n. 126.
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decisions from within the circuit.22 But inter-circuit conflicts
develop because the circuits are not bound to follow each other's
decisions.23 The Supreme Court, exercising discretionary review
only, resolves relatively few such conflicts. 24 Thus, the key
decisional structures of the courts of appeals have come to
emphasize the "law of the circuit" rather than uniform federal
law.25 The law of the circuit doctrine, in turn, cements the
minimal-disruption criterion. Because federal law is settled
circuit by circuit and inter-circuit conflicts develop, any change
in circuit boundaries would be accompanied by a change in the
law applicable to some citizens.26 As a result, all realignments of
states to circuits since the Evarts Act have taken place within
existing circuit boundaries that date to the Civil War era.27
The article continues by inquiring whether meaningful
structural reform is possible within the geographic organizing
principle and concludes that Congress is unlikely, for good
reasons, to abandon this broad principle. It goes on to suggest
the types of reform Congress could consider within the regional
organizing principle. This Part concludes that reform remains
possible only if Congress is willing to reconsider its adherence
to some or all of the accepted criteria for circuit structure.
The article ends by concluding that reform proposals
invariably run afoul of one or more of the accepted criteria and
yet seem likely to achieve relatively little. If Congress
undertakes a serious reform effort, it should acknowledge that
disruption is inevitable and focus on the important, enduring
characteristics of the courts of appeals as small, generalist courts
inferior to the Supreme Court. These characteristics are far more
central than the specific criteria for drawing circuit boundaries.

22. Dragich, Uniformity, supran. 5, at 538

23. Id. at 538-39.
24. Cf supra n. 2.
25. See Dragich, Uniformity, supra n. 5, at 538; Student Author, Securing Unformity in
NationalLaw: A Proposalfor in the Courts ofAppeals, 87 Yale L.J. 1219, 1224-25 (1978)

(describing the law-of-the-circuit rule as the "concomitant" of division of the courts of
appeals into geographic circuits).
26. See e.g. GeographicalBoundaries, supra n. 13, at 228 (noting that "whatever the

actual extent of variation in the law from circuit to circuit, relocation would take from the
bench and bar at least some of the law now familiar to them").
27. Cf id. (stating that current boundaries date to nineteenth century with exception of
creation of Tenth Circuit in 1929).
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In the end, the most significant obstacles to meaningful reform
are the highly political nature of the task; Congress's preference
for piecemeal reforms; and the Constitution's inferiority
mandate.
II. THE NEED FOR FEDERAL COURTS

Article III establishes a "supreme Court" and allows for
"such inferior Courts as Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish." The scope of Congress's powers to create (or
not) lower federal courts, and its power to strip the federal courts
of jurisdiction authorized by Article III, are matters of
considerable and enduring controversy.2 8 In large part, this
controversy hinges on one's view of the need for federal courts,
and hence of the proper roles of such courts. Another important
variable is one's view of the ability of state courts to fill any
void left by failure to create federal courts or to vest them fully
with the jurisdiction Article III authorizes.2 9 This article
recounts only so much of this controversy as is necessary to
establish a point of departure for considering the structure of the
courts of appeals.
Two roles are commonly ascribed to the federal courts.30
The simpler of the two is that federal courts are needed to serve
as neutral arbiters in cases involving states as parties31 or cases
involving parties from different states.3 2 The state courts were

28. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, FederalJurisdiction (5th ed., Aspen Publishers,

Inc. 2007).
29. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., et al., Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the
Federal System 278-83 (6th ed., Foundation Press 2009) (discussing the "parity debate").
30. See generally id at 7-8 (discussing need for and roles of lower federal courts);

Charles Alan Wright & Mary Kay Kane, Law of Federal Courts 2-3 (7th ed. West 2011)
(same); Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court: A Study

in the FederalJudicialSystem 7-9 (Macmillan 1928) (describing need for federal courts to
provide uniformity in certain types of cases, and to lessen friction among states).
31. See Wright & Kane, supra n. 30, at 3 (noting early experience with disputes
between states).
32. Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action FairnessAct of 2005 in Historical Context:

A Preliminary View, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1439, 1460 (2008) (discussing early cases and
continuing re-examination of diversity jurisdiction). Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction
was (and remains) controversial. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action FairnessAct in
Perspective: The Old and the New in FederalJurisdictionalReform, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev.

1823, 1829-30(2008).
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considered by some to be incapable of deciding such cases in an
unbiased manner, or in a manner that litigants would necessarily
accept as impartial.3 3 But here, the federal courts are merely
alternative tribunals to which litigants may resort.34 Federal
diversity jurisdiction is not exclusive, it is limited by the amount
in controversy and other requirements, and it is declining as a
percentage of federal court caseload.
The other major role for federal courts is to ensure the
supremacy of federal law. The theory of "dual sovereignty," 35
which holds that the federal and state governments are sovereign
within their independent spheres, suggests that the courts of each
government must be emP owered to serve as ultimate arbiters of
that government's law. The only departure comes from the
Supremacy Clause, which establishes that federal law trumps
state law in case of a conflict.37 Supremacy demands
authoritative and uniform interpretation and application of
federal law. If this were not the case, state courts could indeed
hear all cases in the first instance, subject only to discretionary
review by the United States Supreme Court. While Article III
gives Congress discretion not to create lower federal courts,
there are reasons to think that some lower federal courts may be
required. In some areas, federal jurisdiction is exclusive. 39 The

33. Burbank, supra n. 32, at 1461-62; Fallon et al., supra n. 29, at 7-8 (recounting
Madison's fears of bias in state courts).
34. See e.g. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426 (1996) (pointing

out that "[fjederal diversity jurisdiction provides an alternative forum for the adjudication
of state-created rights"). In cases of litigation between two states, of course, the Supreme
Court is the only available arbiter. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (providing for Supreme Court's
"original and exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more states")
(available at http://uscode.house.gov).
35. See e.g. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-60 (1991).

36. In re Tarble, 80 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1871) (noting that "[n]either government can
intrude within the jurisdiction, or authorize any interference therein by its judicial officers
with the action of the other," save for "the supremacy of the authority of the United States
when any conflict arises between the two governments," for "[t]he Constitution and the
laws passed in pursuance of it, are declared by the Constitution itself to be the supreme law
of the land").
37. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.2. The impact of the eleventh amendment on the ability of
federal courts to enforce federal law requirements against the states is beyond the scope of
this article.
38. See Dragich, Uniformity, supra n. 5, at 541-43 (discussing authorities).
39. See e.g. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (admiralty); 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (bankruptcy); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a) (patent and copyright).
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power of state courts vis-A-vis federal officers is limited in
certain ways. 4 0 The Constitutional requirement of a Supreme
Court to superintend the exercise of the whole "judicial power"
of the United States seems to many scholars to imply the
existence of some lower federal courts.4 1 The equal protection
clauses in the fifth and fourteenth Amendments, which must be
read as modifying Congressional power over the federal courts,
require uniform protection of federal law to persons across the
country. The argument is that federal courts are either required,
or at least better situated, to fulfill the supremacy mandate.
State court judges, of course, are bound by the Supremacy
Clause to apply federal law regardless of contrary provisions in
state law, 42 but evidently are not always trusted to do so.43 The
relative incapacity of state judges is explained variously as
deriving from their vulnerability to majoritarian political
pressures;4 their lesser qualifications, pay, and prestige; 45 their
greater parochialism; 46 and so forth. Participants in the longrunning "parity" debate contest all of these ideas.47 But the fact
is that Congress immediately created lower federal courts, and it
is now unimaginable that we could do without them.
40. "A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court against" a
federal officer or agency may be removed to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1442. States lack
power to enjoin federal officers. E.g. Keely v. Sanders, 99 U.S. 441, 443 (1878) (pointing
out that "no State court could, by injunction or otherwise, prevent Federal officers from
collecting Federal taxes"). State courts may not issue writs of habeas corpus for the release
of federal detainees. Tarble, 80 U.S. at 410-11 (discussing relationship between state and
federal courts and pointing out that "the State judge or State court should proceed no
further when it appears, from the application of the party, or the return made, that the
prisoner is held by an officer of the United States under what, in truth, purports to be the
authority of the United States").
41. See e.g. James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Strippingand the Supreme Court's Power
to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1433 (2000).

42. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; see also James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State
Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionalityof Jurisdiction-StrippingLegislation, 101 Nw.

U. L. Rev. 191, 212 (2007) (discussing constitutionally required "inferiority" of state
courts).
43. See generally Fallon, et al., supra n. 29, at 278-83 (discussing "'parity' debate").
44. Id. at 279-80.
45. Id. at 279.
46. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal

Judiciary,36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 233, 283 (1988).
47. For an extended defense of state court judges, arguing in particular that they display
little hostility to federal claims, see Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Respecting
State Courts: The Inevitability ofJudicialFederalism 34-42 (Praeger 1999).
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The necessity of federal courts does not tell us anything
about their ideal design, but form should follow function.
Professor Rosenberg suggested that any plan to reform the
federal courts should be "parsimon[ious] in creating new
judgeships" and should "avoid multiplicity of appeals,"
"jurisdictional disputes," and "[s]pecialization of [a]ppellate
[j]udges." 4 8 Indeed, the federal courts have been characterized
by a small corps of judges, limited opportunities for appeal, and
general (if limited) jurisdiction. Beyond these considerations,
the courts of appeals were created to ease the burden on the
Supreme Court, provide a realistic opportunity for appeal, and
provide for appeal to a multi-member court rather than to a
single judge.49'
This article focuses on the supremacy-maintaining function
of the federal courts. All the characteristics just mentioned can
be linked with the need for authoritative, uniform interpretation
of federal law. Familiar arguments link fewer judges with more
highly qualified judges and higher-quality decisions. The higher
prestige associated with an elite position (not to mention the
tenure and salary protections of Article III) is thought to attract
the finest judges.50 Collegiality, often thought to be a
prerequisite for high-quality appellate decisionmaking, is
enhanced when the corps of judges is small enough that judges
know one another well.5 1 The involvement of both the Senate
and the President in the selection of federal judges should ensure
that these judges have a national rather than parochial focus. It is
also accepted that greater consistency of decision is possible
among a smaller cadre of judges.5 2 Limiting avenues for appeal
also minimizes a multiplicity of conflicting decisions. The
48. Maurice Rosenberg, Planned Flexibility to Meet Changing Needs of the Federal

Appellate System, 59 Cornell L. Rev. 576, 587-88 (1973).
49. See 21 Cong. Rec. 10226 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Dolph) (noting that under thenexisting system courts were under-staffed: in many cases there was no appeal allowed,
leaving "the decision of a single judge [as] final," and Supreme Court's docket was out of
control); id. at 3404 (1890) (remarks of Rep. Culberson) (describing "judicial despotism"
and "kingly power" of district and circuit judges).
50. See Jon 0. Newman, 1,000 Judges-The Limit for an Effective FederalJudiciary,
76 Judicature 187 (1993) (discussing prestige, quality, and visibility of federal judges).
51. See Frank M. Coffin, Grace Under Pressure: A Call for Judicial Self-Help, 50

Ohio. St. L.J. 399, 401 (1989).
52. Gerald Bard Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice, 79 A.B.A. J. 70, 71-72 (July
1993).
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provision of generalist rather than specialist jurisdiction is

thought to reduce parochialism, partiality, and the risk of capture
by interested parties.53 Thus, the concentration of the federal
appellate judicial power in a limited number of small, generalist
courts should tend to promote the supremacy function of the
federal courts.
None of these arguments hinges on regional organization,
but Congress chose a regional organizing principle in 1789 and
has stuck with it. One key feature of Congress's first articulation
of the federal court system was that trials and appeals be heard
in various parts of the country.54 The legislative history of the
Judiciary Act reveals significant concern for the convenience of
litigants.55 Another key feature was the relatively flat design of
the system, with Supreme Court justices playing an active role
in both trials and appeals. To do so while accommodating the
convenience of litigants, Supreme Court justices were required
to "ride circuit." 56 Under conditions then prevailing, travel even
to a limited number of districts was difficult for judges; 57
without regional division, constituting the circuit courts would
have been virtually impossible.58 Moreover, these realities
required the establishment of relatively small circuits.

53. Cf Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 118
(1982) (White, J., Burger, C.J., and Powell, J., dissenting) (discussing generalist versus
specialized tribunals).
54. See e.g. James E. Pfander, Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme
Court's Supervisory Powers, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1515, 1550-51 (2001); Akhil Reed
Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the OriginalJurisdictionof the Supreme Court, 56 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 443, 469-76 (1989) (discussing geographic concerns of the Framers).
55. Pfander, supra n. 54, at 1550; Amar, supran. 54, at 472.
56. Kristin A. Collins, "A Considerable Surgical Operation": Article 111, Equity, and
Judge-Made Law in the Federal Courts, 60 Duke L.J. 249, 295 (2010) (discussing the
"circuit-riding system" as the "glue that was to ... bind[] these far-flung outposts of
federal justice into a system").
57. Erwin C. Surrency, History of the FederalCourts 35 (2d ed., Oxford U. Press 2002)
(noting that the pre-1891 organization of states into circuits "was for the sole purpose of
assigning the justices to a given geographic region of the country for the purpose of
holding the circuit courts").
58. See Wythe Holt, "The Federal Courts Have Enemies in All Who Fear Their
Influence on State Objects": The Failureto Abolish Supreme Court Circuit-Ridingin the
JudiciaryActs of 1792 and 1793, 36 Buff. L. Rev. 301, 306 (1987) (describing cost savings
to both government and litigants, as well as convenience to litigants).
59. Supreme Court justices complained frequently about the burdens of riding circuit,
especially in the huge southern circuit. See Surrency, supra n. 57, at 43-45 (describing
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Regional organization ensured that litigation in federal court
would be reasonably convenient for litigants and would afford
them the protections of local juries. At the same time, regional
organization helped establish the presence and power of the new
federal government across the nation. As Part III argues,
regional organization of the federal courts also promoted
uniformity of federal law and counteracted presumed local bias,
while attending to local concerns and facilitating application of
state law in appropriate cases. Regional organization was not,
however, necessary in and of itself.

III. FEDERAL-STATE

RELATIONS AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATION

The early states "had very different economic and social
systems," 60 and most people at the time "identified themselves
foremost as citizens of their States, and secondarily as
Americans."61 Congress consequently took care to alleviate fears
that the nascent federal government would overtake established
state government institutions-including the state courts-and
ignore local customs and values. 62 As a result, the federal and
state courts have always overlapped in both geography and
jurisdiction, and the courts of each system have always been
expected to apply the law of the other in appropriate cases.
Modern consensus holds that the complex structure of the
federal judiciary reflects compromises necessary to secure the
supremacy of federal law while respecting the rights of the states
to control matters within their constitutional competence. 63

circuit duty and noting that most of the justices rode on average 2,000 miles per year, while
Justice McKinley (of Alabama) rode 10,000 miles).
60. Robert J. Reinstein, Foreword: On the Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 17

Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 343, 351 (2008).
61. Id.
62. See generally Wythe Holt & James R. Perry, Writs and Rights, "clashings and
animosities": The First Confrontation Between Federal and State Jurisdictions, 7 L. &

History Rev. 89, 95-97 (1989) (discussing opposition to creation of lower federal courts).
63. Cf Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 Va. L. Rev.
1141, 1144-45 (1988) (describing competing understandings of the "Federalist" and
"Nationalist" models of judicial federalism). Professor Fallon defines the "Federalist"
model as one based on respect for state sovereignty and on deference to state judicial
proceedings, while the "Nationalist" model is based on a "preference for federal courts
over state courts as guarantors of federal rights." Id. Regarding the use of the terms
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Geographic organization of the federal courts was a ke
feature implementing this compromise in the original design.
Professor Caminker describes the federal judicial structure as
requiring "a centralized decisionmaker within a system of
decentralized access." 65 Locating federal courts around the
country provides decentralized access, while jurisdictional
arrangements and determination of the governing law establish a
central focus for decisionmaking.
Under the 1789 Act, each federal district encompassed a
state;66 each of the three original circuits comprised two or more
districts. 67 Regional organization both respected and transcended
state boundaries. It allowed for consideration of both national
and local concerns.
A. Local Interests andNational Interests
The original district courts, whose boundaries were
coterminous with those of the states, were designed primarily to
be responsive to local interests. The inclusion of the local
district judge on the circuit court was one way to assure
sensitivity to local interests. The requirement that otherwise

"national" and "federal," see Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie
after the Death ofDiversity? 78 Mich. L. Rev. 311, 320 n. 33 (1980).
64. See generally Julius Goebel, Jr., The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801, at 470-73

(Cambridge U. Press 1971) (describing the creation and specific structure of the inferior
courts, highlighting in particular their "localization"); Surrency, supra n. 57, at 35 (noting
that geographical organization was "basic to the functioning of the federal courts [and]
clearly envisioned by the authors of the first Judiciary Act").
65. Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior CourtPrecedents? 46

Stan. L. Rev. 817, 866 (1994); see also id at 833-34 (considering whether judicial
structure compels lower federal court obedience to Supreme Court precedent).
66. Wilfred J. Ritz, Rewriting the History of the Judiciary Act of 1789, at 63-64 (U.

Okla. Press 1990). Adherence to state lines was not inevitable; other organizational
schemes were considered. Id. at 63. The districts of Maine and Kentucky were originally
outside any circuit. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74; see also Maeva
Marcus & Natalie Wexler, the Judiciary Act of 1789: Political Compromise or
ConstitutionalInterpretation?in Origins of the FederalJudiciary:Essays on the Judiciary

Act of 1789, at 22 (Maeva Marcus ed., Oxford U. Press 1992) (discussing drafters'
"deci[sion] to respect preexisting state boundaries" when omitting Maine and Kentucky
from the original circuit system).
67. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74-75. (allocating districts to
circuits).
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"geographically remote" 68 Supreme Court justices travel out to
the states to hold circuit courts was another.69 And to the extent
that Supreme Court justices were assigned to circuits
encompassing their home states, litigants would be further
assured of attention to local concerns. 70 Several additional
features of the federal courts also promoted protection of local
interests: the establishment of district courts within state
boundaries; 7 the requirement that juries be drawn from within
the district; 72 the staffing of district courts with permanent
judges who were required to reside in the district served; 73 and
the role of the Senate in confirming judges. 74 Professor Ritz
suggests that the novel hierarchical structure of the federal
judiciary, in which the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction
was limited to review of questions of law, also protected local
autonomy by preventing re-litigation of facts to a non-local jury
(which might see the matter differently).
The original circuit courts, each comprising two or more
districts, exercised a strange combination of trial and appellate
jurisdiction. These courts played a hybrid role with respect to
68. Pfander, supra n. 54, at 1519; see also James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme
Court's Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 555, 569-71

(discussing decision to provide for circuit-riding by Supreme Court justices).
69. Pfander, supra n. 68, at 569-70, 569 n. 50 (discussing convenience); David R.
Stras, Why Supreme Court Justices Should Ride Circuit Again, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1710,

1710 (2007) (quoting an 1848 statement of Senator Badger reported in the Congressional
Globe implying need for Supreme Court to be familiar with laws and conditions of the
states); Joshua Glick, Student Author, On the Road: The Supreme Court and the History of

Circuit Riding, 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 1753, 1757-61 (2003) (discussing various advantages
of circuit riding); 21 Cong. Rec. 10231 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Morgan) (discussing
advantages of having circuit judges "go out and intermingle with the people").
70. See Surrency, supra n. 57, at 43-44 (noting that in "the early decades of the
Nineteenth Century, justices were assigned to the circuit in which they lived").
71. Kermit L. Hall, The Politics of Justice: Lower FederalJudicial Selection and the

Second Party System, 1829-1861, at 3 (U. Neb. Press 1980) (noting that each federal
district court "was made responsive to local interests by being established wholly within
the boundaries of a particular state").
72. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 29, 1 Stat. 73, 88.
73. Id. at § 3.
74. Hall, supra n. 71, at 4 (noting, in a discussion of the appointment of district judges,
that "[b]y requiring the consent of the Senate, the Constitution insured that local interests
would have an important role in the selection process").
75. Ritz, supra n. 66, at 11-12. Congress chose not to implement jurisdiction in the
Supreme Court to reexamine facts. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84-85.
The Seventh Amendment, adopted in 1791, elevates this choice to one of constitutional
dimension. See U.S. Const. amend. VII.
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local interest versus nationalizing function. The role of the
regional circuit courts, it has been argued, was to promote the
authority and legitimacy of federal court decisions by involving
Supreme Court justices at the trial stage. 76 Supreme Court
justices were required to ride circuit not only so that they would
appreciate local concerns,77 but also to help spread the power
and presence of the national government throughout the
country. 78
These factors led naturally to regional organization of the
original circuit courts. The requirement that Supreme Court
justices participate in holding court across the country called for
some sort of geographical division of responsibilities. The desire
that federal judges appreciate local concerns and apply local law
in many cases suggested the creation of regional circuits
comprisin
contiguous states with common interests or
traditions. Regional differences at the time were considered
significant, 80 giving rise to the notion that rules appropriate in
one region might not be suitable in another. 1 Given the irregular
publication of legal materials,82 as well as the unavailability of
comprehensive law libraries, it would have been difficult for
federal judges to handle cases from a wide variety of states.
Instead, by concentrating their attention on a small number of

76. Holt, supran. 58, at 306-07.
77. See Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, JudicialDuty and the Supreme Court's Cult of
Celebrity, 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1255, 1264-65 (2010) (discussing views of members of
the First Congress).
78. Collins, supra n. 56, at 293-95.
79. One justification for circuit riding, for example, was that it required the justices to
"'be brought into contact with the great mass of the community, as they are now by
traveling into different sections of the country, and becoming to some extent acquainted
with local facts, the character of our people, and the various interests in different parts of
the country."' Stanley I. Kutler, Judicial Power and Reconstruction Politics 57 (U. Chi.
Press 1968) (quoting Senator Charles R. Buckalew).
80. See Reinstein, supra n. 60, at 352 (noting that at the time of founding, "people of
one region were ignorant and suspicious of the people of the other [region]s").
81. See Holt, supra n. 58, at 321 (quoting Chief Justice Jay's view that "state
jurisprudence 'was accommodated to local, not general convenience, to partial, not national
policy"'). This view is in tension, of course, with the notion that much non-federal law was
of a transcendent, "general" character.
82. See Ritz, supra n. 66, at 10, 46-52.
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nearby states, federal judges could master the law and procedure
of those states and apply them with confidence. 83
The Judiciary Act's jurisdictional provisions illustrate the
compromise between local and national interests. The district
courts, for example, were assigned original jurisdiction over
admiralty and maritime cases and minor federal crimes. Circuit
courts had jurisdiction over most federal criminal cases, and
concurrently with the state courts, over diversity cases as well.84
This arrangement enhanced the national role in cases of national
interest 8 by "eliminat[ing] most ordinary cases" from federal
court dockets.8 6 The presence of both a Supreme Court justice
and the local district judge on the circuit courts incorporated a
strong national perspective to balance local ties of district judges
even at trial. Cases assigned to the circuit courts would draw
upon this dual perspective rather than that of the district judge
alone, as in the district courts. At the same time, this
jurisdictional allocation preserved an important role for state
courts to decide local disputes.

83. Cf Philip B. Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court and the Erie

Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 Yale L.J. 187, 217 (1957) (noting that "[i]f judicial
expertise in the law of the state in which the district court sits is really to be the test, review
of its rulings on state law ought to be permitted only when the appellate bench is also made
up of judges from the same state jurisdiction"). Professor Ritz disputes altogether the
premise that federal judges ought to be expert in the law of particular states: "It would have
literally been unthinkable for the members of the First Congress to have directed national
courts sitting in diversity cases to apply the law of the states in which they sat." Ritz, supra
n. 66, at 79. The hypothesis that familiarity with state law promotes better federal court
decisionmaking still surfaces from time to time. See e.g. Mich. v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1039 (1983) (noting that the "process of examining state law [in the context of determining
whether an adequate and independent state ground of decision exists] is unsatisfactory
because it requires us to interpret state laws with which we are generally unfamiliar").
84. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78-79; see Ritz, supra n. 66, at 6466 (describing division of jurisdiction between district and circuit courts); see also
Chemerinsky, supra n. 28, at 10-11; Holt & Perry, supra n. 62, at 100 (1989) (describing
diversity jurisdiction and removal process).
85. See Ritz, supra n. 66, at 66 (noting that assignment of admiralty cases to district
courts and of diversity cases to circuit courts appears "topsy-turvy"). Ritz reconciles the
apparent contradiction with reference to problems of bias, noting that admiralty law was
inherently uniform, whereas diversity cases raised the possibility of local bias if heard by
the local district judge sitting alone. Id.
86. Holt & Perry, supran. 62, at 100.
87. Cf Ritz, supra n. 66, at 66 (describing divergent knowledge bases and viewpoints
of Supreme Court justices and district judges); see also Goebel, supra n. 64, at 472-73
(similar).
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Moreover, Professor Collins argues that the provision of
federal equity jurisdiction had a profound unifying tendency.
Even if federal judges were mandated to apply state law in
diversity cases on the "law side"88 of the docket, in equity cases
the federal courts "conform[ed] to a national standard ...
regardless of the remedies available in the forum state courts." 89
Section 34 "applied only to actions at common law," not in
equity. 90 Thus, although there was "significant variation of
equity practices in the individual states," 91 "horizontal
uniformity-of-equity principles" soon became the "explicit norm
in federal equity cases." 92 Because states' equity rules varied
considerably, the application of uniform federal equity rules
"would result in a different outcome." 93 The Supreme Court
"insist[ed] on federal uniform equity principles" both "to ensure
litigant equality [of access to the federal courts] and uniform
administration of justice throughout the federal judicial
system." 94
On balance, these features suggest Congress took care to
ensure that regional organization did not swamp national
interests. Congress did not regard circuit boundaries as
sacrosanct but rather was willing from the very beginning to
redraw circuit boundaries as needed to accommodate national
expansion. 95 Circuit boundaries shifted even at a time when the
federal courts were called upon to decide far more cases by
reference to state law, and fewer on the authority of federal law,
than they do today. This flexibility indicates that the geographic
circuits served federal interests and did not enshrine any
particular alignment of states to federal courts.
A place in which tensions between national and local
interests came to a head was commercial law. 96 One historian
88. Collins, supra n. 56, at 258.
89. Id. at 276.
90. Id. at 283.
91. Id. at 267.
92. Id. at 266.
93. Id. at 276-77.
94. Id. at 300-01.
95. See Surrency, supra n. 57, at 36-42 (discussing numerous reconfigurations);
Russell R. Wheeler & Cynthia Harrison, Creating the FederalJudicial System 9-19 (2d
ed., Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1994) (same, and including a series of helpful maps).
96. Collins, supra n. 56, at 330; see also Frankfurter & Landis, supra n. 30, at 8-9.
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writes:

As the national economy evolved, the federal system-the
division of authority between local, state, and national
governments-increased
the
cost
of economic
development. Several factors fostered uncertainty in the
federal system. First, there was little or no uniformity in the
local law of the states governing rights and obligations
arising out of private transactions. This lack of uniformity
was pronounced enough that many times the local law
included different rules on similar or even identical issues.
. . . Furthermore, interstate rivalry and local distrust of

outsiders generated state laws and regulations that frankly
discriminated against out-of-state business. Until the early
twentieth century, this uncertainty in many of the "rules of
the game" governing interstate enterprise no doubt
constituted something of a barrier to economic
development, a barrier that would have been higher except
for the federal courts. 97
The national interest in facilitating interstate commerce was
one factor in the allocation of federal court jurisdiction, as
discussed in the next section.
B. FederalJurisdictionand State Jurisdiction
Article III authorizes broad jurisdiction in the federal
courts, but only a small portion of it may be exercised as an
original matter by the Supreme Court. Article III leaves to
Congress to decide how to structure the lower federal courts. 98
The jurisdictional provisions of Article III, however, establish
important parameters of lower federal court design by providing
a greater federal role in some types of cases than in others. 99
As is well known, Article III declares that the "judicial
power shall extend" to enumerated cases. These cases fall into
97. Tony Allan Freyer, Forums of Order: The Federal Courts and Business in
American History xvii (JAI Press, Inc., 1979) (footnotes omitted).
98. See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299, 309 (1803) (noting that "Congress have
constitutional authority to establish from time to time such inferior tribunals as they may
think proper; and to transfer a cause from one such tribunal to another").
99. Cf Kan. v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 183 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing the
idea that the Constitution's allocations of jurisdiction-and specifically of the Court's
power to review state court decisions-are closely connected to the objective of
"ensur[ing] the integrity and uniformity of federal law").
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two categories. 00 In the first category, Article III extends
federal judicial power to "all Cases" arising under the
Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States; affecting
ambassadors or other public ministers and consuls; or involving
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction.10 This category is based on
the nature or subject matter of the case and, by extension, its
relevance to national interests.102 Justice Story explained that
"all the cases enumerated in [this] class [are of 'vital
importance'] to the national sovereignty."1 03 These cases "enter
into the national policy [and] affect the national rights." 0 4
Accordingly, federal jurisdiction "should be commensurate with
the mischiefs intended to be remedied, and. .. should extend to
all cases whatsoever." t 0 5 The statutory grant of exclusive federal
jurisdiction in some cases within this jurisdictional category
100. See Fallon,supra n. 29, at 14-18. Recent scholarship explores the distinctions and

relationships between the two categories or "tiers" of federal jurisdiction. See e.g. Akhil
Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal
Jurisdiction,65 B.U. L. Rev. 205, 209-10 (1985).

101. Article III makes federal jurisdiction exclusive in cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction and in cases affecting ambassadors and consuls. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2
(extending the federal judicial power to "all" such cases). Congress may provide for either
exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction over cases arising under the constitution, federal laws,
and treaties. Id (extending the federal judicial power to such "controversies").
102. Cf John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 L. &
Contemp. Probs. 3, 12-14 (1948) (discussing need to provide federal jurisdiction sufficient
to secure effective national government and provide for the conduct of international
relations).
103. Martin v. Hunter'sLessee, 14 U.S. 304, 334 (1816).
104. Id. at 335.
105. Id. Given Justice Story's view of the importance of cases in this category to the
new federal union, it is somewhat surprising that Congress did not provide for general
federal question jurisdiction until much later. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations
Between State and FederalLaw, 54 Colum. L. Rev 489, 501 (1954) (referring to Judiciary
Act of 1789, in which, "[flar from giving the lower federal courts a broad common law
jurisdiction, Congress withheld from them any general jurisdiction whatever even in cases
arising under the Federal Constitution, statutes or treaties"). But at the time of the creation
of the lower federal courts in 1789, there was little federal law to serve as the basis for
general federal "arising under" jurisdiction even if Congress had provided for it. Donald L.
Doemberg, The Unseen Track of Erie Railroad: Why History and JurisprudenceSuggest a

More Straightforward Form of Erie Analysis, 109 W. Va. L. Rev. 611, 615 (2007)
(pointing out that "[i]n the beginning, there was the law that the states used," and "[t]hat
was all there could have been"). Instead, Congress sometimes provided for federal question
jurisdiction under specific federal statutes. Westen & Lehman, supra n. 63, at 367, n. 166
(noting that "[a]lthough Congress did not vest the federal courts with general federal
question jurisdiction until 1875, it did include within the Judiciary Act of 1789 jurisdiction
over certain specialized federal questions" (emphasis in original)).
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marks them as clearly "federal" for purposes of federal-state
choice of law.106 Moreover, federal courts continue, after Erie,
to create and apply federal common law in admiralty and
maritime cases, and in other cases of "dominant federal
interest,"l 07 regardless of the lack of any constitutional or
statutory directive that they do so.'os
The
second
jurisdictional
category
comprises
"'controversies to which the United States [is] a party,"' as well
as "controversies" between states, and those
between a state and citizens of another state; between
citizens of different states; between citizens of the same
state, claiming lands under grants of different states; and
between a state or its citizens thereof, and foreign states,
citizens, or subjects.' 0 9
Cases in this jurisdictional category, which is based on the
identity of the parties, do not require exclusive federal
jurisdiction and may be left to the state courts. Chief Justice
Marshall observed that the Constitution, by providing for federal
diversity jurisdiction,
either entertains apprehensions [that the state courts will
not administer justice impartially to parties of every
description] or views with such indulgence the possible
fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has established
national tribunals for the decision of controversies between

aliens and a citizen, or between citizens of different
states. 1 10

106. Cf Donald L. Doemberg, Juridical Chameleons in the "New Erie" Canal, 1990

Utah L. Rev. 759, 778-81 (1990) (discussing various reasons why federal courts apply
federal rather than state law). Even when (as in the usual case) the grant of federal
jurisdiction is not exclusive, the Supreme Court has interpreted particular federal statutes
(such as the Labor Management Relations Act and the Sherman Act) "as a command to
create federal common law." Id. at 779.
107. See Doemberg, supra n. 105, at 644-59 (recasting Supreme Court's substance/
procedure dichotomy in Erie line of cases as terms relating to presence or absence of a
dominant federal interest).
108. Doemberg, supra n. 106, at 778.
109. Martin, 14 U.S. at 327 (quoting constitutional provisions). The Constitution
authorizes exclusive original federal jurisdiction in state-party cases. U.S. Const., Art. III,
§ 2, 2. The 1789 Act provides for original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction in some such
cases. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80-81.
110. Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 87 (1809), overruled in part on other grounds,
Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497 (1844).
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Article III "enables the parties, under the authority of
congress, to have the controversies heard, tried, and determined
before the national tribunals," which were more likely to be
impartial."' In these cases, the Constitution and Congress
provide an alternative tribunal, but not a change in applicable
law.112
In sum, the Constitution allocates federal jurisdiction
between two broad categories of cases1 3 to meet two important
objectives. Cases implicating federal sovereignty and important
national interests are allocated to the federal courts, in some
instances exclusively and in others concurrently with state court
jurisdiction. The objective is to ensure the availability of a
federal tribunal to protect federal interests from errors or
encroachments by the states.1 4 The 1789 Act implemented
relatively little of this jurisdiction, but this category has steadily
expanded.15 Article III also allocates to the federal courts cases
111. Martin, 14 U.S. at 347. In providing for diversity jurisdiction, Congress originally
limited that jurisdictional grant to "those cases where prejudice was to be feared, in which
'the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another
State."' Hart,supra n. 105, at 501 & 501 n. 31; Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat.
73, 78-79; see White v. Fenner, 29 F. Cas. 1015 (C.C.R.I. 1818) (dismissal on ground that
neither party was a citizen of forum state). The diversity of citizenship grant was expanded
in 1875. See Tony Allan Freyer, Harmony & Dissonance: The Swift and Erie Cases in

American Federalism 55 (N.Y.U. Press 1981) (discussing "the general expansion of federal
judicial authority" during the Civil War and Reconstruction); compare Judiciary Act of
1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (providing that circuit courts have original
jurisdiction, concurrent with state courts, of suits "in which there shall be a controversy
between citizens of different States" without regard to whether the suit is filed in a district
of the state where plaintiff resides) with Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78
(providing that circuit courts have original jurisdiction, concurrent with state courts, of
suits "between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another
State").
112. Gasperini,518 U.S. at 426.
113. See Amar, supra n. 100, at 205, 208-09 (building upon theories of Justice Story
regarding two "tiers" of jurisdiction).
114. See e.g. Chemerinsky, supran. 28, at 272 (noting widespread acceptance of the idea
that "a federal forum should exist for federal law matters and that Supreme Court review of
state court decisions is insufficient to adequately ensure such a forum").
115. Federal question jurisdiction originally was provided for only within specific
statutes. See David E. Engdahl, Federal Question Jurisdiction under the 1789 Judiciary

Act, 14 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 521, 522 (1989) (arguing more broadly that "all cases which
then could have been contemplated as within these 'federal question' terms were provided
for" in the 1789 Act); see also id at 533-34 (summarizing history of various additions to
federal question jurisdiction). For example, the existence of federal question jurisdiction in
Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 817 (1824), "depend[ed] entirely on the language
of the act," meaning the act chartering the bank. General federal question jurisdiction was
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in which a party might face bias in the state courts. The 1789
Act implemented much of this jurisdiction, concurrently with
state court jurisdiction.11 6 The objective in these cases was to
provide an impartial tribunal for adjudication of the controversy,
to provide the appearance of justice throughout the nation, and
to prevent the outbreak of serious conflict among the states. This
category has slowly contracted." 7
Regardless of whether a litigant sought to pursue a federal
question or feared state court bias in a diversity case, regional
organization of the lower federal courts provided ready access to
a federal court possessed of jurisdiction to hear the claim."' On
balance, however, the jurisdiction implemented by Congress in
1789 seems heavily weighted to the identity-of-party category,
including diversity of citizenship cases. The balance today is

enacted in 1875. Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470. Federal question
jurisdiction formerly was conditioned on an amount on controversy; this requirement was
eliminated in 1980. Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369, 2369-70 (1980) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1331). A
number of federal statutes provide for jurisdiction exclusively in the federal courts. See e.g.
Michael E. Solimine, Rethinking Exclusive FederalJurisdiction,52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 383,

386-87 (199 1). Such statutes negate the usual presumption that federal jurisdiction, even in
federal question cases, is concurrent with that of the state courts. See e.g. Chemerinsky,
supra n. 28, at 268-69.
116. In providing for diversity of citizenship jurisdiction Congress originally limited that
jurisdictional grant to "those cases where prejudice was to be feared, in which 'the suit is
between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State."'
Hart, supra n. 105, at 501 n. 31; see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78-79.
This provision was amended in 1875. See Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470,
470 (providing that circuit courts have original jurisdiction, concurrent with state courts, of
suits "in which there shall be a controversy between citizens of different States").
117. See A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure,78 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 353, 365-66 (2010).
118. Professor Pfander suggests that
Article III sought to guarantee access to a first instance federal tribunal for
certain claims that the Framers were unwilling to leave to state courts. In
describing the [Original Jurisdiction] Clause as authorizing original jurisdiction
only as to the specified claims, however, the Federalists sought to assure the
nation that Congress would not be able to expand the original docket of the
geographically remote Supreme Court.
Pfander, supra n. 54, at 1519 (footnote omitted) (considering power of Congress to expand
original jurisdiction of Supreme Court). By contrast, a proposal (rejected by the Framers)
that the Constitution vest in the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over cases in which the
United States was a party would have "threatened individuals around the country with
government enforcement of the[ir] manifold obligations [to the federal government] before
a distant tribunal and jury." Id. at 1556.
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quite different. 119 While diversity jurisdiction has been
broadened beyond cases in which plaintiff files in the courts of
her home state, 120 the amount in controversy requirement has
steadily risen. 12 1 Diversity cases have fallen dramatically as a
percentage of federal court caseload. 122 Diversity jurisdiction is
widely believed today to be the least important component of
federal jurisdiction, and calls for its complete elimination are
common.123 By contrast, federal question jurisdiction has
expanded in various ways. The amount in controversy
requirement was eliminated in 1980.124 An increasing number of
federal statutes provide for jurisdiction exclusively in the federal
courts. 12 5 Federal question cases now make up the major portion
of the federal courts' caseload.126
C. State Law, General Law, and FederalLaw
As noted above, the federal courts' docket in the early days
included mainly "private disputes between citizens of different
119. See e.g. Dolores K. Sloviter, A FederalJudge Views Diversity Jurisdictionthrough
the Lens of Federalism, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1671, 1687 (1992) (discussing reduced need for
diversity jurisdiction).
120. Compare the original text of Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78-79
(providing federal diversity jurisdiction "where ... the suit is between a citizen of the State
where the suit is brought") (emphasis added) with the language of the present diversity
jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (providing jurisdiction "where the matter . . . is
between citizens of different States") (emphasis added).
121. See Fallon et al., supra n. 29, at 1355-56 (recounting history of amendments to
statute providing for diversity jurisdiction).
122. See supran. 4.
123. See e.g. Judith Resnik, History, Jurisdiction,and the Federal Courts: Changing
Contexts, Selective Memories, and Limited Imagination, 98 W.Va. L. Rev. 171, 183-84
(1995) (referring to a then-current plan that "urg[ed] Congress to turn over to the state
courts much of the diversity docket (about 50,000 cases or about a quarter of the current
federal civil docket)"); id. at 184 n. 39 (collecting authorities). But trial lawyers argue for
its preservation. See e.g. Tammy A. Sarver, Resolution ofBias: Tort Diversity Cases in the
U.S. Courts ofAppeals, 28 Just. Sys. J. 183, 184 (2007).
124. Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2(a),
94 Stat. 2369, 2369-70 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
125. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., CaseloadBurdens and JurisdictionalLimitations: Some
Observationsfrom the History of the FederalCourts, 46 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 7, 12 (200203).
126. The trend is not absolute, however. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, for
example, expands federal jurisdiction over state-law cases involving multiple parties and
multiple claims. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, § 4
(now codified in various sections of Title 28).
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states or foreign nations."' 2 7 "[D]iversity jurisdiction exists
precisely so that federal courts might decide cases differently
from state courts, e.g., without 'bias."' 28 One question is
whether the federal courts were thought to be fairer only
"because [their] personnel are supposedly . . . more free from

local prejudice," or also because they are "to apply a substantive
law that is itself less locally biased." 29 Most discussions of the
issue have focused on the former rationale, relating to state court
personnel.130 One account, however, suggests that even after the
Civil War,
leading corporate businesses engaged in interstate
enterprise encountered [not only] hostile local judges and
juries distrustful of the power of business, [but also] state
laws aimed at controlling or preventing activities of such
businesses.' 3 '
In response, "federal judges . . . used their [diversity]
jurisdiction . . . to establish a uniform corporate jurisprudence
administered in federal court." 32 Despite criticism, this state of
affairs prevailed until the 1930s.1 33
The Rules of Decision Act (RDA), which directs federal
courts to apply "the laws of the several states" as the rules of
decision "in cases where they apply," was enacted as section 34
of the Judiciary Act of 1789. 4 The conventional wisdom is that
section 34 forces a choice between federal law and state law, 135
127. Freyer, supra n. 97, at xix; see also Kurland, supra n. 83, at 196 (quoting
Lumberman's Mutual Cas. Ins. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 54 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.,

concurring: "[tihe stuff of diversity jurisdiction is state litigation")).
128. Craig Green, Repressing Erie's Myth, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 595, 610 (2008).
129. Ritz, supran. 66, at 8; ef Collins, supra n. 56, at 253-54 (discussing early federal
courts' application of "nonstate, judge-made principles" in federal equity cases not only to
promote uniformity but also "precisely because of the failure of the forum state's laws to
provide adequate relief').
130. See e.g. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1120-28
(1977) (discussing various advantages attributed to having federal constitutional claims
heard by federal judges).
131. Freyer, supra n. 97, at xix.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, § 34; see also Collins, supra n. 56, at 262 (aptly
describing this mandate as "oblique").
135. See Westen & Lehman, supra n. 63, at 314; Doernberg, supra n. 105, at 612-13,
665-66 (describing and refuting conventional view, and suggesting an interest-balancing
alternative).
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but some scholars argue otherwise.' 36 This provision may have
been "intended to remove the objection of those who had
opposed" the creation of lower federal courts on the ground that
these courts would have "the right of . .. determining the rules

by which their judgment shall be regulated." 37 Under this view
of the RDA, "state law would continue to govern unless federal
law displaced it."' 38 Alternatively, the RDA may have been
intended simply to "provide for the application of American law
rather than English law," 39 or for the application of "general"
law common to all the states rather than the law of a particular
state,140 except in cases involving purely local issues. 14
In 1789, the primary role of state courts was the
"exposition" of the common law; this function "lay at the heart
of the role of the judiciary." 42 At the time the Constitution was
ratified, "the law that the states used [including perceived
natural law]... was all there could have been" for the federal
courts to apply. 14 3 Accordingly, "a good starting point for the
study of the federal common law might be the premise that in
delegating to the federal courts a judicial power, the Constitution
136. See e.g. Ritz, supra n. 66, at 9-10 (arguing that in enacting section 34 Congress
"could not have had the intent attributed to it by Erie");see generally Collins, supra n. 56.
137. Kurland, supran. 83, at 202 (quoting Charles Warren).
138. Doernberg, supra n. 105, at 618 (describing this view as resulting from the "uneasy
settlement that the Framers reached" between state and federal power); see also id. at 645
(stating that "one should begin analyzing any [federal-state] choice-of-law problem by
presuming that state law applies").
139. Ritz, supra n. 66, at 76.

140. Id. at 140-41 (contrasting the phrases "several states" and "respective states"); see
also Collins, supra n. 56, at 263-64 (citing William A. Fletcher, The General Common
Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97

Harv. L. Rev. 1513, 1527-28 (1984)). The application of "general" law, rather than the law
of a particular state, would have had a "centralizing" influence. Harry N. Scheiber,
Federalism and the American Economic Order, 1789-1910, 10 L. & Socy. Rev. 57, 102

(1975).
141. Freyer, supra n. 111, at 14 (distinguishing general "laws" from local "customs").
142. Doemberg, supra n. 106, at 801 (quoting Student Author, The Federal Common
Law, 82 Hary. L. Rev. 1512, 1516 (1969)); see also Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory
Power of the Supreme Court, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 324, 376 (2006) (describing differences
between Founding-era and modem federal courts' perceptions of "the judicial role in
common law cases"); see generally id. at 376-79.
143. Doemberg, supra n. 105, at 615, 645 n. 190. In the absence of federal legislation or
a body of federal decisional law, the early federal courts had recourse to only two sources
of law according to Justice Iredell: "the particular laws of the State . . . [o]r [p]rinciples of
law common to all the States." Chisholm v. Ga., 2 U.S. 419, 434 (1793).
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delegated the same type of power that state courts
possess[ed]."'4 Federal law was then an entirely undeveloped
"new category of law";145 "state law governed nearly all areas of
But "[ajs federal law developed, some of it
society."
displaced state law." 47 Thus, the question of choice of law in
the federal courts was an important one.
By the antebellum era, there were "three types of law: state
law, federal law, and natural law, often referred to as 'general'
law." 48 Judges and lawyers of this era probably failed to discern
a "sharp distinction between federal and state law." 49 At the
time, the distinction between "general" and "local" law would
have been more salient. 50 "General" law included commercial
law, which was founded on "universal principles" accepted
throughout the "commercial world."' 5 ' "Local" law, by contrast,
involved matters such as title to land.152
Under the jurisprudential theory of the time, in which
judges merely "discovered" the (independently existing) law,1 53
"general" law principles, upon which all states' decisional law
rested, "were not considered state law within the meaning of the
RDA" unless and until "declared" by state statute.154 Thus, it
may be that section 34's reference to "the laws of the several
states" does not "assume[] the existence either of discrete bodies
of definitely ascertainable state law, or of some discrete body of
national law as contrasted to state law."' 5 5 The determination as
to which cases call for the application of state law is also a

144. Doemberg, supra n. 106, at 801 (quoting The Federal Common Law, supra n. 142,

at 1516).
145. Doemberg, supra n. 105, at 614.
146. Id. at 615.
147. Id. at 645.
148. Id. at 617; see also Collins, supra n. 56, at 263-64.
149. Cf Ritz, supra n. 66, at 24 (noting that "we modems" assume the existence of such
a distinction).
150. Freyer, supra n. 111, at 35-38.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 29-34.
153. Doemberg, supra n. 105, at 617 (citing Blackstone); Doemberg, supra n. 106, at
801-02 (quoting The Federal Common Law, supra n. 142).

154. Doernberg, supra n. 105, at 623.
155. Ritz, supra n. 66, at 78.
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matter of debate,156 but may hinge on the particular grant of
jurisdiction that allows the case to be heard in federal court.157
The cases where state law was to "apply" are likely to be those
"controversies" that reached federal court because of the
character of the parties, not the nature of the case.15 8
The Supreme Court's Swift decision in 1842159 interpreted
the Rules of Decision Act to require federal courts to apply state
statutes but not state decisional law. Swift, in other words,
approved federal court development of a "general common law"
where there was a need for national uniformity.1 60 According to
Professor Hart,
the conception of questions of general commercial law as
depending essentially upon the discerning ascertainment
and wise application of principles common to the Englishspeaking world, rather than upon any "law" peculiar to a

156. See e.g. Ritz, supra n. 66, at 146 (stating that Section 34 "provides no clue as to
which are the cases where [state laws] are to be applied"); Doernberg, supra n. 105, at 618
(noting that "[iut is difficult to know what to make of the last clause [of section 34]").
157. See Westen & Lehman, supra n. 63, at 311-16 (describing debate about whether
Erie doctrine applies to diversity cases only or also to federal-question cases); Alfred Hill,
The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U. L. Rev. 427, 441-42 (1959) (explaining

why "a federal court may appropriately 'make' law under one head ofjurisdiction and not
under another"); see also Ritz, supra n. 66, at 8-10 (discussing various possible
interpretations of Section 34); but see id. at 75 (noting that in Ritz's view, authors of
Section 34 saw the problem "as being applicable to the whole of the federal jurisdiction,
not separable depending upon the subject involved").
158. See Doernberg,supran. 105, at 618 (pointing out that "federal courts have assumed
that Congress intended [the RDA] as a direction to federal courts to apply a particular body
of law in diversity cases"); Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law in an Age of
Treaties, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 892, 930 (2004) (suggesting that RDA may carry a different
meaning "when federal courts act within the scope of an existing federal enactment" than
when they act in diversity cases). The Erie opinion itself suggests that the RDA may be
"merely declarative of the rule which would exist in [its] absence." Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72 (1938) (quoting Mason v. U.S., 260 U.S. 545 (1923)). In
Guaranty Trust, the Court suggested that the RDA "was deemed, consistently for over a
hundred years, to be merely declaratory of what would in any event have governed the
federal courts." Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1945); but see

Kurland, supra n. 83, at 203-04 (discussing constitutional basis of Erie and casting doubt
on theory that Erie is merely declarative of existing rule).
159. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1842), overruled, Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304

U.S. 64 (1938).
160. Cf Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New FederalCommon Law, 39

N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 387-88 (1964) (discussing alternate ways in which the Erie Court
might have disposed of-or allowed the death of-Swift).
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particular jurisdiction was "congenial to the jurisprudential
climate of the time."

In theory, all judges (state or federal) would "find" the
same law.162 Hart noted, however, that even in 1842 it "should
have been apparent that the wisest of judges would differ upon
such questions."'163 The multiplicity of decisionmakers in fact
Because general federal
led to inconsistency of results.'
common law decisions were not binding on state courts,165 Swift
led to divergent rulings not only between states but also in
"federal courts and state courts 'a block away' from each
other."l 66 Swift thus failed to produce the desired "nationally
uniform common law." 67 Dissatisfaction resulted with the
'

161. Hart, supra n. 105, at 505 (quoting Guaranty Trust). Common law was still thought
to be found (pre-existing), not made. Id.; see also Kenneth C. Cole, Erie v. Tompkins and
the Relationship Between Federal and State Courts, 36 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 885, 889, 893

(1942). "General common law" applied by federal courts was not "federal common law"
but rather a transcendent law found and elaborated by federal judges in the same manner as
by state judges. Any competent judge, using accepted methods of analysis, would
presumably arrive at about the same result. Cf Hart, supra n. 105, at 505; see also Kurland,
supra n. 83, at 190-91.
162. Cf Green supra n. 128, at 604-06 (describing Swift-era legal notions, including the
proposition that many common-law judges simply "discovered" "primordial ideals"
embodied in the common law, and noting that "federal courts crafted common law in
diversity cases using the same techniques as state courts").
163. Hart, supra n. 105, at 505; see also id. at 506 (noting that the resulting inconsistent
rulings amounted to an "offense to the most basic concepts of justice according to law").
164. Id.
165. Cole, supra note 161, at 886 (noting that the availability of federal diversity
jurisdiction added to, rather than reduced, the area of disagreement). Professor Doemberg
explains:
Here the difference between the natural-law and the legal-positivist approaches
becomes critical.

. .

. The [federal courts knew] .

.

. three sources of law ...

until Erie. First, there was federal law, which stemmed from the Constitution,
from federal statutes and from judicial decisions of questions of law that fell
within one of the Constitution's grants of federal power. Second, there was state
(or, as Justice Brandeis referred to it, "local") law. Under Swift, that included
state constitutions, state statutes, and state decisional law that related to local
matters. General rules of contract law applicable in the states were not
considered state law within the meaning of RDA unless declared by state statute;
they were general common law not associated with any sovereign. That body of
"general commercial law" was common (so to speak) to the states and the
federal government. Neither could authoritatively expound it to the other. That is
why the state courts were able to "persist" in their own opinions of general law
without running afoul of the Supremacy Clause.
Doemberg, supra n. 105, at 623-24.
166. Green, supra n. 128, at 606.
167. Id. at 601.
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of Swift, leading to the overruling of

that decision in 1938.169
D. Creation of the Courts ofAppeals in 1891
The courts of appeals were established at a time when the
balance between federal law and state law and the caseload mix
between diversity and federal question cases were about to begin
a marked shift toward their modem form.170 Both the country
and the federal courts had changed markedly between 1789 and
1891. Interstate commerce had grown along with the expansion
of the nation, causing business interests to press for the uniform
commercial law that had not developed under Swift. 7' Federal
court caseloads in 1891 still consisted predominantly of
diversity cases, despite the passage of the post-Civil War
constitutional amendments and an increasing number of federal
statutes172 and the authorization of general federal question

jurisdiction. 7 3
Against this background, the Evarts Act of 1891 created
new courts of appeals using the circuit boundaries that had been
in place since 1866.174 Congress's refusal to alter circuit
boundaries as the country grew created vast circuits in the West,
each including states with widely varying history, law, practice,
168. Cf Friendly,supra n. 160, at 384.
169. Erie, 304 U.S. 64.
170. See generally Fallon, supra n. 63, at 1144-45 (noting that a "vast reordering" of
federal-state relations was "inaugurated by the Civil War and Reconstruction").
171. Freyer, supra n. 97, at 99-114 (describing post-bellum demographic, commercial,
and legal developments and the resulting need for more uniform and more certain law
across the country); Friendly, supra n. 160, at 405-06 (discussing Swift's failure to achieve
uniformity).
172. See Fallon, supra n. 63, at 1145 (describing "vast reordering of federal relations"
following the Civil War and Reconstruction); id. at 1159 (stating that state sovereignty
"must be viewed as vastly diminished, if not eviscerated, by the Reconstruction
amendments").
173. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137 § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1331).
174. See Surrency, supra n. 57, at 87 (noting that 1891 Act made "no adjustments ... in
the organization of the circuits"); Wheeler & Harrison, supra n. 95, at 19 (map showing
1866 circuit boundaries); 21 Cong. Rec. 3399 (1890) (including remarks of Rep.
Breckinridge noting that "these nine separate courts will be located in what are now the
nine circuits of the United States" and indicating Rep. Rogers's agreement with that
statement).
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and current interests. This adherence to antiquated boundaries
was due in large part to partisan wrangling.' 7 5 The existing
regional boundaries, established for convenience and formerly
redrawn as needed, now took on an important significance in
defining the new courts.176 But the only relevant political
systems in the United States are federal and state; regions have
Professor
never had independent political significance.
Carrington forcefully states:
The structure of the courts of appeals was not intended to
allow regional adaptation of federal law. On the contrary,
the legislative history of the Evarts Act indicates that these
courts were intended to harmonize and unify the national
law, not to fragment it. Further, circuit regionalism violates
the premise of the commerce clause and other provisions . .

. of the Constitution that national uniformity is desired on
many subjects of federal legislation. It would be a most
peculiar scheme of government whose judiciary made
decisions in the regional interest without the support or
restraint of any politically responsible executive or
legislative officials. The needs of regionalism are
adequately protected by a healthy respect for federal-state
relations and, in exceptional circumstances, by federal
legislation which explicitly incorporates state law.

Developments following the Evarts Act tended to reflect
the rising national interest. The "rise of legal positivism" in
place of the natural law theory "rema[d]e the American view of
law as a whole and of the law of federal-state relations in

175.
efforts
176.
courts
noting

See Frankfurter & Landis, supra n. 30, at 77-102 (recounting history of reform
from 1875 to 1891).
Dragich, Uniformity, supra n. 5, at 560, 562-68 (discussing evolution of federal
of appeals); see also 21 Cong. Rec. 3399 (1890) (remarks of Rep. Breckinridge
that the version of the bill then under consideration "create[s] nine separate courts").

177. Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts ofAppeals: The Threat to the
Function ofReview and the NationalLaw, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 542, 602-03 (1969). This kind

of battle played out in the long struggle about how to divide the old Fifth Circuit. During
the 1950s and 1960s, federal law (requiring desegregation) was at odds with state policy in
the South (favoring segregation). Federal judges differed in their deference to state policy.
Southern Senators tried to divide the Fifth Circuit in such as way as to minimize the
influence of so-called "activist" federal judges by isolating them in a two-state circuit and
assigning the remaining four states to a more conservative circuit. See generally Barrow &
Walker, supra n. 18.
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particular."l 7 8 Given the marked changes in the caseload,
jurisdiction, and role of the intermediate federal courts since
their creation, this article argues that the primary contemporary
role of the federal courts of appeals is application and
development of federal law which ought to be reasonably
consistent across the nation.174

IV. RE-EXAMINING

ACCEPTED CRITERIA
FOR REGIONAL STRUCTURE

According to the Report of the Federal Courts Study
Committee, "five fundamental characteristics" of the federal
courts of appeals have persisted since their "creation in 1891."518o
This account holds that the courts of appeals comprise the only
intermediate tier of courts in the federal system,' 8 ' provide
litigants an appeal as of right,1 82 assign cases for decision by
three-judge panels,' 83 are organized geographically,' 84 and are
divided into circuits rou hly approximating the number of
Together, these characteristics
Supreme Court justices.
describe both the decisional and geographic structures of the
modem courts of appeals. Other characteristics of the federal
178. Doemberg, supra n. 105, at 617 (noting that legal positivism and natural law "could
not co-exist").
179. Many others have made this argument, though it is by no means universally
accepted. See e.g. Dragich, Unformity, supra n. 5, at 540-44 (summarizing uniformity
arguments and citing sources).
180. Federal Courts Study Committee, Judicial Conference of the United States, Report
of the FederalCourts Study Committee 113 (1990).

18 1. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. It is not quite accurate to say that the assignment of cases to three-judge
"panels" dates back to 1891. The 1891 Act defines the new courts as "consist[ing] of three
judges, of whom two shall constitute a quorum." Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 2, 26
Stat. 826, 826. The Act also provides that Justices of the Supreme Court, circuit judges,
and district judges "shall be competent to sit as judges of the circuit court of appeals within
their respective circuits." Id. at § 3, 26 Stat. 827. Section 3 also refers to the "full court"
(apparently meaning three judges), but does not speak of panels. Id. The Supreme Court in
1940 authorized the system of sitting in panels; Congress ratified this decision in 1948.
Dragich, supra n. 5, at 565, nn. 204-06.
184. Report of the FederalCourts Study Committee, supra n. 180, at 113.
185. Id. Note that 28 U.S.C. § 42 mandates "allotment" of Supreme Court justices
among the circuits. For current assignments, see Allotment Order, www.supremecourt.gov/
orders/courtorders/ALLOTMENTORDER9-28-10.pdf (Sept. 28, 2010).
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courts have changed over the years,186 including the rising

caseloads of the courts of appeals and the processes and
procedures they employ to deal with expanded caseloads.' The
function of these courts has also evolved from error correction
alone to include significant law-making. 8 8
Taking a regional organizing principle and the decisional
structures of the courts of appeals as a given, the question
remains how well the specific criteria for circuit structure
implement the essential design. The answer would seem to be
not very well, in that "[t]he present circuit boundaries are old
and irrational." 89 The practice of decision by panels rather than
en banc, combined with application of the rule of stare decisis
among panels within a circuit but not among circuits, gives rise
to inter-circuit conflicts in federal law. The specific regional
structure of the courts of appeals seems ripe for reconsideration
in light of current realities. This Part examines each of the
accepted criteria for circuit structure, discussing both their
origins and their contemporary relevance.
A. Realignment Should Avoid Excessive Interference in
EstablishedCircuitAlignment
According to the Commission on Structural Alternatives
for the Federal Courts of Appeals, the circuit boundaries drawn
by an 1866 statute "are largely still in existence," because
"[s]ince 1866, Congress has accommodated new states by
adding them to existing circuits."l 90 Recent modifications in
circuit structure have adhered strictly to the minimal-disruption

186. Cf Collins, supra n. 56, at 255 (noting that "radical transformations
occurred in our understanding of the judicial power as set forth in Article III").

...

have

187. Report of the FederalCourts Study Committee, supra n. 180, at 114 (discussing

increases in caseloads, judges, law clerks and other staff, as well as reductions in oral
argument and increase in summary dispositions and settlement programs).
188. See Martha J. Dragich, Will the FederalCourts ofAppeals Perish if They Publish?
Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a

GreaterThreat? 44 Am. U. L. Rev. 757, 766-68 (1995) (citing sources).
189. Carrington, supran. 177, at 586.
190. White Commission Report, supra n. 7, at 9.
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criterion.191 For example, the division of the old Fifth Circuit
into the new Fifth and Eleventh Circuits was accomplished
within existing circuit boundaries, despite the fact that broader
realignments were at least briefly considered. 192 The same was
true decades earlier when the current Tenth Circuit was split off
from the former Eighth Circuit.' 93 Almost all recent proposals to
divide the Ninth Circuit, even proposals to divide the current
circuit into three new circuits, take the outer boundaries of the
existing -circuit as a given. 194
Recent history sharply diverges in this respect from the
early history of the lower federal courts. In less than eighty
years, "Congress realigned the circuits thirteen times,"' 95 freely
grouping states into new combinations as necessary or desirable.
For example, Delaware was at times part of a circuit also
containing the states of New Jersey and Pennsylvania, while at
other times was paired only with Maryland. Virginia was paired
at times with North Carolina alone, and at other times with
Maryland, West Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina.
South Carolina was originally paired with Georgia; these two
states later came to be in separate circuits.
When the intermediate appellate courts were created in
1891, the existing circuit boundaries remained despite the fact
that the function of the intermediate courts-and countless other

191. The Hruska Commission denominated this the "principle of marginal interference."
GeographicalBoundaries,supra n. 13, at 232.

192. Consideration was given, for example, to moving Arkansas from the Eighth Circuit
to join the portion of the restructured Fifth Circuit containing Texas. See e.g. id. at 232-34.
Professors Barrow and Walker provide a detailed account of political and strategic
considerations leading to the split of the former Fifth Circuit. Barrow & Walker, supra n.
18, at 62-218.
193. New Mexico was added to the new Tenth Circuit at this time. Theodore J. Fetter,
History of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 43-45 (Judicial

Conference of the United States, Bicentennial Committee 1977) (describing various plans
for splitting the Eighth Circuit that were discussed at the time).
194. See e.g. Ninth Circuit Judgeship and Reorganization Act of 2004, S. 2278, 108th
Cong. § 3 (proposing the division of states and territories in the existing Ninth Circuit into
three new circuits: one composed of California, Guam, Hawaii, and the Northern Marianas
Islands; one composed of Arizona, Nevada, Idaho, and Montana; and one composed of
Alaska, Oregon, and Washington). A few proposals suggested moving Arizona from the
Ninth Circuit to the Tenth Circuit. See e.g. White Commission Report, supra n. 7, at 55-56.
195. White Commission Report, supra n. 7, at 8.
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aspects of life in the United States-had changed completely.' 96
After 1891, "circuit boundaries no longer allocated Supreme
Court justices' trial court duties; rather circuit boundaries
defined the territorial reach of appellate court jurisdiction." 97
The overlay of existing boundaries onto a fundamentally new
structure for the lower federal courts suggests that the
boundaries were retained for convenience or political
expediency and were not themselves a deliberate part of the
design of the new courts of appeals. Changes in the boundaries
were anticipated. 98
Moreover, at the time the new appellate courts were
created, Congressional intent to authorize those courts to
develo a new "law of the circuit" was unarticulated, to say the
least.' In fact, these courts were created in response to a "nearbreakdown of the [federal] judicial system," 2 0 traceable to a
"vast expansion of judicial business" under the Reconstruction
Amendments, post-Civil War statutes, and the authorization in
1875 of "general federal question jurisdiction." 201 The federal
trial courts had become "'the primary and powerful reliances for
vindicating every right given by the Constitution, the laws, and
treaties of the United States.' 2 The overwhelming expansion
of federal judicial business fueled a crisis of appellate judicial
196. See Frankfurter & Landis, supra n. 30, at 56-64; see also Charles W. Nihan &
Harvey Rishikof, Rethinking the Federal Court System: Thinking the Unthinkable, 14

Miss. C. L. Rev. 349, 374 (1994) (pointing out that "the present arrangement of circuits
(apart from the Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits) derives from legislation enacted in
1866").
197. White Commission Report, supra n. 7, at 11.

198. See 21 Cong. Rec. 10230 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Morgan, observing that "[w]e
shall find it necessary to readjust these circuits very soon... because the population over
[the Pacific Slope] is so large and they are scattered over such a vast area that it seems to
me impossible that either the present or the proposed arrangement for circuit judges can be
sufficient for the administration of justice in that region of [the] country"); see also id. at
10228 (remarks of Sen. Dolph, arguing that "California, Oregon and Washington should
not be in one circuit, with all their vast coast line and with the great amount of admiralty
business there is in courts of those districts").
199. One criticism of the bill was that it would negate the "preservation of a
homogeneous jurisprudence" by creating separate courts, each rendering final and
conclusive decisions. 21 Cong. Rec. 3407 (1890) (remarks of Rep. Breckinridge); see also
id at 10222 (remarks of Sen. Evarts, answering a similar objection by noting that there
would be "uniformity of decision").
200. White Commission Report, supra n. 7, at 10.

201. Id.
202. Id (quoting Frankfurter & Landis).
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administration, which the new courts of appeals were intended
to address. The precipitating event was the Supreme Court's
inability to manage its docket. Thus, the focus was on increasing
federal appellate capacity nationwide, not by region.
When federal judges applied mainly state law to decide
mostly local controversies, and when federal law was made and
supervised effectively by the Supreme Court alone, circuit
boundaries could change as necessary without disrupting
existing law.203 Responsibility for the development of law,
whether state or federal, rested with courts other than the courts
of appeals. Circuit boundaries did not carry adjudicative
significance.
The development of the law of the circuit doctrine has
changed the picture by creating precedent binding within a
particular circuit but not beyond it. Now, when federal courts
decide mostly federal controversies, and when the courts of
appeals serve as important lawmaking bodies in the federal court
system, changes in circuit boundaries would disrupt established
federal law. At least where there are unresolved inter-circuit
conflicts, the interpretation of federal law could change for
people living in states that were shifted from one circuit to
another. Probably for this reason, Congress has preferred simply
to split existing circuits into smaller units. The newest circuits
started from an established base of precedent created by the
204
Thus, changes in the law occurred
former circuit.
within the context of a specific dispute
and
only
incrementally
considered by the new court.
As long as the law of the circuit doctrine remains in place
and the Supreme Court is unable to resolve all inter-circuit
conflicts, the minimal-disruption criterion is likely to stymie
reorganization of the courts of appeals. Subdivision of existing
circuits is no longer a fruitful strategy. The creation of more,
smaller circuits itself would lead to greater fragmentation of
federal law by increasing the potential for inter-circuit
203. Federal judges might have experienced a learning curve when assigned new states,
however. Cf 21 Cong. Rec. 10230 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Morgan noting difficulty of
dealing with diverse laws of the several states).
204. See e.g. Bonner v. City ofPrichard,661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (1Ith Cir. 1981) (en banc)
(adopting case law of former Fifth Circuit as governing body of precedent for new court);
South Corp. v. US., 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc) (similar reference to
holdings of Federal Circuit's predecessor courts).
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conflicts. 205 Moreover, subdivision within its existing
boundaries is wholly inadequate to resolve the problems of the
Ninth Circuit given the imbalance California cases create within
the circuit's caseload.20 6 Congress should either discard the
minimal-disruption criterion (accepting some disruption as
inevitable in any kind of restructuring) or legislate a departure
from the law of the circuit doctrine. Under either course,
Congress should then find it easier to reconsider the remaining
criteria for circuit structure.
B. Circuits Should Be Composed of at Least Three States
The Commission on Revision of the Federal Court
Appellate System in 1973 stated that "where practicable, circuits
should be composed of at least three states; in any event, no onestate circuits should be created." 207 According to the
Commission,
[a] one-state circuit would lack the diversity of background
and attitude brought to a court by judges who have lived
and practiced in different states. The Commission believes
that such diversity is a highly desirable, and perhaps
essential, condition in the constitution of the federal courts
of appeals. Moreover, only two senators, both from a single
state, would be consulted in the appointment process; a
single senator of long tenure might be in a position to mold
the court for an entire generation. 08
The early history of the lower federal courts provides little
support for the three-state criterion. The Judiciary Act of 1789
arranged the thirteen federal district courts into three circuits,
known as the eastern, middle, and southern circuits. The eastern
circuit comprised four states and the middle circuit comprised
five states, but the southern circuit included only two states.2 09
Several of the early modifications to circuit structure created

205. Carrington, supra n. 177, at 586; see also Wright, supra n. 18, at 973.

206. Cf Carrington, supra n. 177, at 587 (discussing difficulty of splitting Second
Circuit owing to dominance in its caseload of cases from New York).
207. Geographical Boundaries, supra n. 13, at 231-32.

208. Id. at 237.
209. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74. The districts of Maine and
Kentucky were omitted from the Circuit structure. Id.
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other circuits including only two states, 210 and Congress in 1855
created the California Circuit consisting of that state alone.2 11
This history indicates that neither the three-state criterion nor the
narrower rule against a single-state circuit was an essential,
inviolable aspect of the early design of the intermediate federal
courts.
It is true, however, that two-state circuits (and, by
implication, single-state circuits) are "unprecedented in the
history of the courts of appeals" 212 as opposed to the earlier
circuit courts. And there are cogent arguments against the
creation of one- or two-state circuits.2 13 Professor Wright argued
that it is "difficult to overstate the importance" of the federal
courts of appeals as "broad regional courts," 214 explicitly linking
the need for nationally uniform law with the regional character
of the circuits. The federal courts of appeals, he asserted, are
"best able" to serve the "national interest" by applying a
"national system of law" when they are "composed of judges
who have practiced in different states, who have a wide variety
of experience, [and] who are free from the prejudices and
provincialisms which color the thinking of lawyers in any one
state." 215 One- or two-state circuits would draw on a narrower
range of experience and political interests, exaggerate the
influence of a few Senators in the appointment process, and
create a danger that federal judges would come to view their
responsibilities as essentially local.2 16

210. See Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 6, 2 Stat. 89, 90 (Fourth Circuit includes only
Virginia and Maryland); Judiciary Act of 1802, ch. 31, § 4 2 Stat. 156, 157 (Third, Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Circuits consist of only two states each); Judiciary Act of 1837, ch. 34, § 1,
5 Stat. 176, 176 (Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits consist of only two states each).
The 1862 Act created two circuits of only two states each. Kutler, supra n. 79, at 17 (table
showing states in each circuit as of 1860 and 1862).
211. See Judiciary Act of 1855, ch. 142, § 1, 10 Stat. 631, 631. California appears not to
have been accounted for in the 1862 Act, but is included in the 1866 Act as part of the
Ninth Circuit, along with Oregon and Nevada. See Kutler,supra n. 79, at 18 n. 22 (pointing
out that "[i]n 1855 Congress provided a separate circuit for California, with a separate
circuit judge"), 61 (table showing states in each circuit as of 1860, 1862, and 1866).
212. Barrow & Walker, supra n. 18, at 66.
213. See e.g. Carrington,supran. 177, at 58687.
214. Wright, supra n. 18, at 974.
215. Id.
216. Carrington, supra n. 177, at 586-87.
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In this vein, Professor Wright compared the "eminen[t]"
New York Court of Appeals with the even "stronger" Second
Circuit.2 17 Wright noted that "[m]ost of the cases in the Second
Circuit [come from] New York, but for many years a third of its
judges have come from Connecticut and Vermont." 218 Second
Circuit judges from New York were, he noted, "better judges for
having to test their thinking" against judges from the other two
states. 19 Wright argued further that a proposed new Eleventh
Circuit consisting of only Texas and Louisiana "would be
seriously handicapped" by including only states having "unique
[ ] system[s] of jurisprudence" and lacking "the leavening
influence of judges raised in the common law tradition." 22 0

The three-state criterion essentially sets a threshold below
which circuit size is considered inadequate to effectuate federal
interests. Justifications for the three-state criterion reflect the
importance of uniformity of federal law and ensure that federal
interests are not swamped by state interests. But setting the
threshold as low as three states actually works against these
justifications. Few combinations of three states (especially if the
states must also be contiguous) are adequate to create a strong
regional-let alone national-focus for the court. This is
especially so where one of the three states dwarfs the other two
in size, population, and volume of litigation, as New York does,
for example, in the Second Circuit. Rather than using the threestate criterion to insulate the smallest existing circuits from
restructuring, Congress would do better to determine whether,
on balance, it prefers fewer larger circuits than exist in the
present arrangement (providing for an even stronger focus on

federal interests).2 2 '
C. No CircuitShould Contain Non-Contiguous States
The organization of the lower federal courts into circuits
has generally, but not invariably, followed the contiguity
217. Wright, supran. 18, at 975.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 976.
220. Id.
221. This assertion assumes that Congress finds the Ninth Circuit's case-management
procedures adequate to ensure proper functioning of a large circuit.
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principle. It appears that in 1855, the two states of Alabama and
Louisiana made up the Fifth Circuit, while the intervening state
of Mississippi, along with part of Arkansas, made up the Ninth
Circuit.222 The current assignment of Puerto Rico to the First
Circuit and the Virgin Islands to the Third Circuit, rather than
assignment of both territories to the geographically more
proximate Eleventh Circuit, would appear to violate the
contiguity criterion, but perhaps territorial status somehow
obviates the need for contiguity in circuit structure.22 3 In any
event, all circuit boundaries place contiguous states into separate
circuits.
The contiguity principle likely had its origins primarily in
convenience for circuit-riding justices, as well as for lawyers
and litigants. This reason is no longer salient. Even if regional
circuits are still desirable, or if appeals should be heard around
the country and not only in the nation's capital, these goals can
be achieved within a court structure that is not based on perfect
contiguity.
The contiguity requirement may also have roots in
assumptions about the commonality of legal issues and
viewpoints among contiguous states or the greater familiarity of
the bench and bar with the law and practice in neighboring states
than in distant ones.224 These assumptions likely made sense as
222. See Wheeler & Harrison, supra note 95, at 15 (map showing 1855 boundaries).
223. Cf James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals,Article III Courts, and the JudicialPower

of the United States, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 643, 706-15 (2004) (discussing the local nature and
relative impermanence of early territorial courts); see id. at 709 (suggesting that the
"apparent lack of need for uniformity of decision as between the territories and the states
stemmed from the perception that the rights of territorial citizens were defined by reference
to a unique set of local laws . . . and did not extend to the federal rights that citizens of the
United States could enforce in Article III courts"); but see id. at 714-15 (noting that
"territorial citizens are no longer seen as lacking federal rights that can be enforced on an
equal basis with those of other citizens of the United States" and that even in the territories
"some provision for Article III determination" is required today for claims of "federal
rights enforceable against the government").
224. See e.g. Carl Tobias, Sixth Circuit FederalJudicial Selection, 36 U.C. Davis L.

Rev. 721, 746 (2003) (noting that a "jurist who is stationed in a specific jurisdiction will
often have greater familiarity with its substantive laws"); Evan H. Caminker, Precedent
and Prediction: The Forward-LookingAspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 Tex.

L. Rev. 1, 57-58 (1994) (suggesting that district or circuit courts "might offer unique
contributions when discussing region-sensitive areas of law . . . for which, perhaps, the
needs and burdens of federal law would be felt quite differently in varying geographic
regions"). One justification for circuit-riding was that it required the justices to "'be
brought into contact with the great mass of the community, as they are now by traveling
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design principles in the early days, when the federal courts were

primarily concerned with diversity cases and were required to
follow state procedural rules. 225 A contiguity principle makes
less sense today, given the dominance of federal question cases
in the caseload mix and the promulgation of uniform rules of
federal procedure. Today it is as easy to demonstrate the
commonality of legal issues and viewpoints among noncontiguous states226 as it is to demonstrate the diversity of legal
issues and viewpoints between contiguous states.22 7 Moreover,
the contiguity criterion is in tension with the additional criterion,
discussed below, that a circuit should contain states with a
diversity of population, legal business, and socioeconomic
interest. Rather than adhere rigidly to the contiguity criterion,
Congress could restructure the courts of appeals into new,
loosely regional circuits that would roughly evenly balance
workloads while still accommodating convenience of litigants
and judges.
D. A Circuit Should Contain States with a Diversity of
Populationanda Diversity ofLegal, Business, and
Socioeconomic Interests
The diversity-of-business principle appears to rest on the
same insight that underlies the three-state criterion. The theory,
espoused by Professor Wright among others, is that broadly
regional courts of appeals are necessary if these courts are to
into different sections of the country, and becoming to some extent acquainted with local
facts, the character of our people, and the various interests in different parts of the
country."' Kutler, supra n. 79, at 57 (quoting Senator Charles R. Buckalew).
225. Cf Carrington, supra n. 177, at 559-60 (suggesting that federal appellate judges
regularly have deferred to "judgment of the district judge on a doubtful question of state
law" in diversity cases, and implying that district judges know the law of the state in which
they sit, while judges of the federal courts of appeals might not). But the need for federal
judges to know state law may have been overstated even then, given that federal courts
until Erie were not bound to apply state law even in diversity cases. Federal courts
followed state procedural rules until 1938. See Wright & Kane, supra n. 30, at 424-27
(discussing procedural "conformity").
226. California and New York, for example, though widely separated geographically,
may, as the states with the largest and most diverse populations, share a similar political
climate or common problems. California and Massachusetts, as the homes of many hightech companies, may face similar legal issues.
227. Colorado and Utah, for example, although contiguous, have distinct cultures,
histories, and political climates, and may face different legal issues.
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serve national interests.228 The Commission on Revision of the
Federal Court Appellate System explicitly linked this criterion
with the role of the courts of appeals as "national courts." 229 The
theory is that combining states with diverse traditions, and
drawing judges from those states to sit together on courts of
appeals panels, reduces the danger that the views of any one
state will predominate on national issues.
This is so particularly when smaller states within a circuit
are "over-represented" in judgeships compared to their share of
the caseload of a given circuit as, for example, might be said of
Vermont and Connecticut compared with New York in the
Second Circuit.230 Even the smallest states, like Vermont, are
represented
in court of appeals judgeships, often
disproportionately to their populations or volumes of legal
business. This fact shapes the federal courts of appeals (like the
Senate) as an institution primarily directed toward national
interests. The diversity-of-business criterion also attempts to
preserve the generalist tradition of the federal courts by ensuring
that each circuit hears a rich mix of cases and thus avoids
dangers including capture 23 1 and retarded development of the
law.232 All of these arguments can be linked to the desire for a
strong focus on and consistent application of federal law.
Yet this criterion appears to conflict with the contiguousstates criterion, at least to the extent that contiguous states are
228. See text accompanying nn. 218-24, supra.
229. GeographicalBoundaries,supra n. 13, at 232.

230. See Wright, supra n. 18, at 975. In 2007, appeals filed in the Second Circuit were as
follows: Connecticut 347; New York 3,316; and Vermont fifty-five. 2007 Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, Judicial Business of the United States Courts, http:

//www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2007/appendices/BO3ASepO7.pdf.
(2007) (tbl. B-3A: Sources of Appeals in Civil and Criminal Cases from U.S. District
Courts during the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2007). Of the thirteen judges in
active service on the Second Circuit, three are from Connecticut and one from Vermont.
See Federal Judicial Center, History of the FederalJudiciary,BiographicalDirectory of

Federal Judges, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (click on "select
research categories" to search for active Second Circuit judges) (accessed Nov. 30, 2011;
copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). Thus, while Connecticut and
Vermont together account for about eleven percent of the cases, they hold roughly thirty
percent of the judgeships on the Circuit.
231. See Structure, supra n. 13, at 235-36 (dangers of specialized courts).
232. See Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law's Uniformity

Principle, 101 Nw. L. Rev. 1619, 1622 (2007) (quoting Judge Rader of the Federal
Circuit).
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thought to share common interests and issues. It is difficult to
tell whether the diversity-of-business criterion played any role in
the original design of the lower federal courts. The original
structure
combined
New
Hampshire,
Massachusetts,
Connecticut, and New York into the Eastern Circuit; New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia into the
Middle Circuit; and South Carolina and Georgia into the
Southern Circuit. The Middle Circuit, at least, appears to have
incorporated considerable diversity of population, legal issues,
and economic interests,2 33 but this combination may have
resulted more from convenience than design.
Whatever the origins of the diversity-of-business criterion,
its role in federal appellate court structure was a subject of
considerable importance during the struggle over division of the
old Fifth Circuit. Judge John Minor Wisdom was the chief
proponent of maintaining the Fifth Circuit (and others) as large
courts with a diversity of legal business:
Wisdom, more than any other judge on the court, had a firm
philosophical notion of what the courts of appeals should
be. He believed that the circuit courts perform a critical role
in the political system-a role he called the "federalizing
function." This function included the responsibility for
insuring that local legal policies remain consistent with
national policy, and for supervising the lower federal courts
in such a way that this consistency is achieved. Wisdom
strongly advocated that circuits be as large as practically
possible so that the courts of appeals reflect diverse
interests and values. Splitting the Fifth Circuit, regardless
of which geographical configuration was imposed, would

233. For example, New Jersey and Pennsylvania were always free states; Maryland and
Delaware were originally slave states that ultimately sided with the Union; and Virginia
was a slave state that ultimately sided with the Confederacy. See e.g. WGBH/Annenberg
Learner, A Biography of America, The Coming of the Civil War, http://www.learner.org/

biographyofamerica/proglO/maps/index.html (color-coded map titled "Free States and
Slave States, before the Civil War") (accessed Dec. 1, 2011; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process). A less obvious example concerns the attitudes of the
various states to the role that the common law of England should play in the courts of the
new states. See Lawrence M. Friedman, A History ofAmerican Law 110-15 (2d ed., Simon
& Schuster 1985) (discussing choices made by various states, including Virginia,
Delaware, and New Jersey, on this question).
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create two relatively small circuits that might have a
dangerous tendency toward parochialism. 234
Although Judge Wisdom lost the battle to preserve the old
Fifth Circuit intact, his views about the importance of diversity
of business did prevail in determining where to split the circuit.
Early proposals called for the division of the circuit into two
new circuits at the Mississippi River, with two states-Texas
and Louisiana-in the new western circuit, and four statesFlorida Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi-in the new eastern
35
circuit.
Proponents of this arrangement seemed to rely on a
version of the contiguity criterion that stressed the desirable
commonality of states within a circuit:
This seems to be a natural territorial division in view of the
fact that it [Mississippi] lies east of the Mississippi River.
The natural and inherent interests, including transportation
facilities and communications, seem to indicate that the
State of Mississippi should be in a circuit east of the
.,,236
river.

The eventual compromise that placed Mississippi in the western
circuit had the effect, amonpg others, of preventing the creation
of an "oil and gas" circuit 23 or a circuit drawing exclusively on
the civil law traditions of Texas and Louisiana, 2 38 and of
including a relatively balanced array ofjudicial attitudes towards
civil rights on both new circuits.2 3 9
Contiguity and diversity of business appear to be somewhat
inconsistent objectives. It may be that the contiguity criterion
mattered more when the federal courts' caseload was heavily
weighted toward diversity cases requiring application of state
law. By the same token, the diversity-of-business criterion

234. Barrow & Walker, supra n. 18, at 25-26 (internal footnote omitted).
235. Id. at 63-65. The Biggs Committee also considered moving Texas into either the
Eighth or Tenth Circuit. Id. at 64. Several other realignments were considered by the
Hruska Commission. GeographicalBoundaries, supra n. 13, at 232-34.
236. Barrow & Walker, supra n. 18, at 64-65 (quoting the Biggs Committee).
237. Id. at 192.
238. Id. at 164 (describing opposition of Louisiana bench and bar to a two-state circuit);
cf id at 173 (noting suggestions that Texas and Louisiana should form a circuit by
themselves "because those two states had such unique law"), 179 (discussing Arkansas's
negative reaction to a proposal to place it in a circuit with Texas and Louisiana, "two states
which have a Civil Law background").
239. Id. at 65-74.
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arguably matters more today, when the caseload is dominated by
federal question cases. Congress could easily fashion
manageable circuits incorporating a diversity of legal business
even if it departed from the contiguity criterion to some degree.
E. No State Should Be Split Between Two or More Circuits
The organization of the federal courts has always respected
state boundaries. Each state originally comprised one federal
judicial district. 240 Early on, when the caseload of a district
required the appointment of an additional judge, generally a new
district was created, with a new place of holding court provided,
and the new judge was assigned there.2 4 1 District boundaries
within state lines have changed fairly frequently over the years,
generally for convenience or in response to increased
caseload.24 2 This pattern of creating new districts by subdividing
existing ones continued into fairly recent times, long after
district courts became multi-ju e courts, with two new districts
But district boundaries have
added in California in 1966.
never crossed state lines. 24
The original federal circuits were constituted from the
federal districts, not from the states directly,24 5 but because the
districts themselves were coextensive with state lines, no federal
240. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 3, 1 Stat. 73, 73-74. The portion of Massachusetts
that later became the state of Maine was made a district separate from that of
Massachusetts, and the portion of Virginia that later became the state of Kentucky was
made a district separate from Virginia.
241. 21 Cong. Rec. at 3407 (1890) (remarks of Rep. Breckinridge describing expansion
of federal district courts).
242. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Looking Backward: The CentralDistrict of California,

36 Sw. U. L. Rev. 245, 245 (2007) (describing creation of the District Court for the Central
District of California).
243. Bradley B. Williams, When California'sSouthern District Became Central:A Brief
Look at the Historical Context of the CentralDistrict in 1966, 36 Sw. U. L. Rev. 175, 175

(2007).
244. Surrency, supra n. 57, at 39 (stating, with reference to the 1837 Act in particular,
that "[a]t no time were states that were organized into two or more districts divided
between different circuits"). The lone exception is the District of Wyoming, which extends
into the portions of Montana and Idaho that lie within Yellowstone National Park. 28
U.S.C. § 131.
245. The 1789 Act provides that "the before mentioned districts, except those of Maine
and Kentucky, shall be divided into three circuits." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1
Stat. 73, 73 (emphasis added).
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circuit split a state. And with but a few early exceptions, when
states were divided into two or more federal judicial districts, all
the districts of a state were assigned to the same federal circuit.
One exception involved the inclusion of only the Eastern
District of Arkansas in the Ninth Circuit in the 1850s. 246
The whole-state criterion made sense when the federal
courts in the majority of their cases applied state law. State law
is a meaningful unit, deriving as it does from a single political
authority. It is intended to apply indivisibly throughout the
whole state. Therefore, to the extent that federal judges play a
role in applying state law, the design of federal courts would do
well to facilitate intra-state uniformity in that exercise.
Structural ways to encourage that uniformity would be to
minimize the number of individual federal actors authorized to
affect state law (even provisionally),2 4 7 and to ensure that federal
judges have occasion to master the law and legal culture of the
particular states whose law they are expected to apply.
State law is no less relevant a concept today than in 1789,
so this criterion may continue to have considerable relevance for
the design of the federal courts. What has changed in the interim
is the extent of federal courts' engagement in applying state law.
Given the marked shift in the federal courts' caseload from
diversity to federal question cases, the federal courts today far
more often apply federal law (whether constitutional, statutory,
or "genuine" federal common law) than state law. That change
suggests that the whole-state criterion may be somewhat less
compelling now than in earlier times. The Hruska Commission
in fact recommended splitting California between two
circuits.
Some difficulties exist, however, including the
246. See White Commission Report, supra n. 7, at 9 (Figure 2-B). At the time, the

Western District of Arkansas remained outside the boundaries of any federal circuit. Id.
247. The rulings of federal judges on questions of state law do not bind the highest court
of the state. See R.R. Commn. of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499-500 (1941)

(discussing possibility that federal ruling on state law questions might be displaced by
subsequent state court decision because "it cannot escape being a forecast and not a
determination," and noting that where the decision of a federal court sitting in equity turns
on an interpretation of state law, it can give only "a tentative answer which may be
displaced tomorrow by a state adjudication").
248. The Commission stated:
The realignment plan we have recommended would divide the judicial districts
of California between the new Ninth Circuit and the proposed Twelfth Circuit.
The division of a state between two circuits would be an innovation in the

246

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

possibility that two federal circuits will differently interpret and
apply the same state statute. 24 9
V. Is REFORm

FEASIBLE WITHIN THE GEOGRAPHIC ORGANIZING
PRINCIPLE?

This article assumes that Congress remains committed to
the enduring characteristics of the federal courts of appeals as
relatively small, generalist courts that provide each litigant one
robust appeal as of right. It further assumes that Congress will
not depart from the general principles of geographic
organization and decision by panels of judges. This Part
considers whether reform is possible given those strictures,
particularly the geographic organizing principle.
Whether meaningful reform is possible depends on what
objectives (within the strictures just mentioned) Congress has in
mind. One set of objectives relates to efficiency in handling
appeals. If Congress values expediency most highly, it could
achieve that objective by increasing the corps of federal judges,
by truncating appellate procedures, or perhaps by creating
specialist rather than generalist courts. If Congress's highest
priority is to equalize workload among judges or circuits and
thereby to expedite decisionmaking, it could do so by adding
more judges where needed or redrawing circuit boundaries. A
competing objective is to preserve federal appellate justice in its
traditional form, involving one appeal as of right, to a multimember court of Article III judges, with oral argument and a
history of the federal judicial system. . . . However, after full consideration, we
are convinced that any problems that might arise are of lesser magnitude and
significance than those created by a single state circuit, or any of the other
proposals that have been suggested to us.
GeographicalBoundaries,supra n. 13, at 238.
249. See Hellman, supra n. 16, at 1192-93 (discussing variety of consequences of
splitting a state among federal circuits). The Hruska Commission viewed these problems as
capable of resolution:
The problems that may be anticipated fall into two broad classes: those
involving actual or potential conflicting orders to a litigant, and those involving
the promulgation of inconsistent rules of law in suits involving different
litigants. Special concern has been voiced over the possibility of conflicting
decisions as to the validity of state statutes or practices under federal law. . . . In
any event, the[se problems] can be resolved by existing mechanisms and others
that could readily be developed.
GeographicalBoundaries,supra n. 13, at 238.
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written opinion in every case. If this is Congress's goal, then it
must add more judges or perhaps eliminate whole categories of
federal jurisdiction, such as diversity. All of these options
involve some sacrifice to one or more of the essential
characteristics of the federal courts of appeals, such as their
relatively small size or their generalist jurisdiction.
Another set of objectives focuses on the role of the courts
of appeals in maintaining the supremacy and uniformity of
federal law. If Congress wishes to provide for greater uniformity
in the interpretation and application of federal law-and to do so
within current organizational and decisional structures-its task
is exceptionally difficult. Consolidating circuits or redrawing
circuit boundaries unsettles federal law in the short run. Adding
judges or subdividing courts into smaller units tends to decrease
uniformity. But without more judges, appellate procedures may
be truncated in some cases, and quicker processing probably
equates with less robust consideration of the issues, including
attention to potential conflicts.
Maintaining the geographic organization of the courts of
appeals helps preserve the federal courts of appeals as small,
generalist courts with clear paths of appeal. Regional
organization imposes a practical, if not an absolute, cap on the
number of judges assigned to any one circuit. 2 50 Adhering to the
current structure also continues the tradition of one appeal as of
right without affording the possibility of additional avenues of
review and maintains the courts of appeals (with the exception
of the Federal Circuit) as generalist courts. The current structure
also avoids jurisdictional disputes among the courts of appeals

250. Even after the nine-judge criterion faded into history, the Eleventh Circuit has
decided that it cannot function properly with its full complement of authorized judges, and
therefore has operated ever since its creation in 1980 with a self-imposed cap of twelve, the
number initially authorized. See Dragich, Uniformity, supra n. 5, at 583 n. 326. The Ninth
Circuit's cadre of authorized judgeships, though by far the largest of any circuit, still falls
far short of the number that would be authorized under a strict ratio of filings to judges. Id
The Judicial Conference's 2011 Judgeship Recommendations include one temporary and
four permanent additional judges for the Ninth Circuit, two additional permanent judges for
the Second Circuit, and an additional permanent judge each for the Third and Sixth
Circuits. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Judicial Conference Judgeship
Recommendations-March 2011, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/JudgesJudgeships/docs
/2011 JudgeshipRecommendations.pdf.
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because it is generally obvious to which regional circuit a

particular decision may be appealed.
But even within these constraints, some structural reform is
possible, particularly if Congress frees itself from the prison
created by the Hruska Committee's "irreconcilable" 252 criteria
for circuit structure. In particular, Congress should consider
which of these criteria remain relevant to the contemporary role
of the courts of appeals. The diversity-of-business criterion
remains important so long as the federal courts are to be
generalist courts. For much the same reason, the three-state
criterion should remain and perhaps be strengthened by
grouping more states together into larger circuits. Doing so
would reduce inter-circuit conflicts and thus promote uniform
interpretation of federal law. The whole-state criterion
implicates federal-state relations in a way that suggests its
retention, at least as long as federal courts continue to have
diversity jurisdiction. The contiguity criterion, on the other
hand, is of little real relevance to circuit structure today.
The changes made possible by loosening the hold of these
criteria are achievable only if Congress is willing to tolerate a
certain amount of disruption. Congress cannot, in other words,
both insist on retaining the specific current structure of the
courts of appeals (to prevent disruption) and enact reforms that
preserve appellate justice in its traditional, robust form.
Congress should take care to preserve the generalist character of
the federal courts and the role of these courts in safeguarding the
supremacy of federal law. Given advances in administration,
travel, and communications technology, the practical
consequences of changing circuit boundaries are minimal.
Rather, the major potential for disruption arises from the
problem of circuit structure itself: variations in law among the
circuits. Congress or the Supreme Court could minimize any
such disruption by weakening the hold of the law of the circuit

251. One exception is that many statutes "permit petitions for review [of agency action]
to be filed in either the D.C. Circuit or the geographical circuit in which the aggrieved
party resides." Jeffery C. Dobbins, Structure and Precedent, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 1453,
1466-67 (2010).
252. David Carlson, Student Author, Adapting Integer Programming Techniques to

Circuit Restructuring, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 583, 605 (2011).
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doctrine.253 Changes in that doctrine would then make other
reforms possible.
One might ask what structural options exist if the law of the
circuit doctrine persists in its current form. The answer, simply
put, is that little can be accomplished. Disruption to settled
circuit law would be greatest if states were shifted into entirely
new circuit alignments. The least disruption results from the
split of an existing circuit; both new circuits start from a defined
base, shared by all citizens and all federal judges within the new
circuits. This option, however, is likely to run afoul of the threestate and diversity-of-business criteria, and it exacerbates intercircuit conflict by increasing the number of independent circuits.
Further dividing circuits (or creating divisions within existing
circuits) is a step in the wrong direction. The next least
disruptive option would be to combine two or more existing
circuits in their entirety. If Congress decided that maintaining
high quality appellate justice required equalization of caseloads,
or that the number of circuits should be reduced to minimize
potential inter-circuit conflicts, it could move in this direction by
combining existing circuits and retaining the current relationship
of comity among the circuits. For example, Congress could
consolidate the existing regional circuitS254 as follows:
253. Dragich, Uniformity, supra n. 5, at 583-88.

254. This analysis excludes the D.C. and Federal circuits. The D.C. Circuit is
structurally a "regional" circuit but has a specialized caseload owing to its location in the
nation's capital. The Federal Circuit is a specialized, not geographically defined, court. For
purposes of comparison to the other circuits, 1,097 appeals were filed in the D.C. Circuit
during the year ended September 30, 2009. Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/Judicial

Business/JudicialBusiness.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/appendices
/BO3SepO9.pdf (tbl. B-3: "U.S. Courts of Appeals-Sources of Appeals and Original
Proceedings Commenced, by Circuit, during the 12-Month Periods Ending September 30,
2005 through 2009") [hereinafter Table B-3]. tn the Federal Circuit 1,367 appeals were
filed during the year ending September 30, 2009. Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics

/JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/ap
pendices/BO8Sep09.pdf (tbl. B-8: "U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-Appeals
Filed, Terminated, and Pending During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30,
2009"). The caseloads of these two courts are the lowest (closely followed by the First
Circuit) of all the courts of appeals. Even if they were to be combined with one or more
other circuits, the effect on the combined court's caseload would be fairly minor. And it
does not seem likely that Congress would choose to combine the Federal Circuit, which
Congress has decided to organize by subject matter, with one or more geographical
circuits.
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Table 1
Possible Reconstitution of Circuits
(with Imputed Caseload)
New Combined Circuit
Appeals Commenced in 2009*
First and Second
7,493
Third and Fourth
9,061
Fifth
7,246
Sixth and Seventh
8,196
Eighth and Tenth
5,441
Ninth
12,211
Eleventh
6,995
*

Figures are from Table B-3, supran. 254.

This structure achieves little, even toward the modest goal
of equalizing workloads. It is a short-term measure at best, for
demographic shifts will continue to skew caseloads. It reduces
regional circuits only from eleven to seven, leaving room for
much inter-circuit conflict. Yet even this possibility may entail
considerable disruption.
Numerous other variations are possible, but all run
headlong into the Hruska Commission's criteria for circuit
structure. If disruption of circuit law were not a problem, states
such as Arizona, Idaho, and Montana could be shifted from the
current Ninth Circuit to a new circuit combining the present
Eighth and Tenth Circuits. This option magnifies disruption yet
still doesn't eliminate a large caseload imbalance between the
Ninth Circuit and all others.25 5 If states could be split between
circuits, the California districts could be split so that the
Northern and Eastern districts remained with the Ninth Circuit
while the Southern and Central districts moved to the new
circuit combining the Eighth and Tenth circuits plus Arizona,
Idaho, and Montana.25 6 Although this arrangement comes closer
255. The new circuit comprising the current Eighth and Tenth Circuits plus the states of
Arizona, Idaho, and Montana (all from the current Ninth Circuit) would have had a
caseload of 6,595 for the statistical year ending Sept. 30, 2009, while the new Ninth
Circuit (minus Arizona, Idaho, and Montana) would still have had 11,057 cases.
256. For the year ending September 30, 2009, that arrangement would have moved
another 2,643 appeals out of the Ninth Circuit and into the new circuit, leaving the Ninth
with 8,414 appeals and the new circuit with 9,238.
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to equalizing caseloads, significant variations still exist. The
price of moving toward equality of caseloads is splitting
California between two circuits and creating a geographically
huge circuit spanning the midwestern, inter-mountain west, and
southwestern states. Disruption is great, as states from three
preexisting circuits (each with distinct bodies of law) are lumped
together, and one state is split between two circuits. It hardly
seems worth the trouble, particularly when 2olitical
considerations likely to affect Congress are factored in.
VI. CONCLUSION
Attempts to restructure the lower federal courts are, and
always have been, highly politicized endeavors.2 5 8 The 1862
reforms were explicitly linked to the slavery issue and were
intended to redress "sectional imbalances" resulting from the
1837 restructuring.259 Much of the struggle surrounding the
division of the old Fifth Circuit hinged on civil rights. 260 Many
discussions of recent proposals to divide the Ninth Circuit are
viewed as attempts to shape environmental law in one way or
257. A recent analysis used computer programming techniques to generate several
models for circuit realignment. See generally Carlson, supra n. 252. The author concluded
that reform is possible but problematic. Id. at 605-07. For example, in order to ensure that
most courts had no more than seventeen judges each, five new circuits had to be added,
many states had to be shifted among circuits, some states had to be split, and some of the
circuits could have only two states. Id. at 600-02.
258. Cf Collins, supra n. 56, at 331-34.
259. Kutler, supra n. 79, at 14 (noting that prior to 1862 the federal court systemincluding the Supreme Court-"reflected the disproportionate southern influence" that
resulted from the creation in 1837 of additional southern circuits). At the time, there were
nine circuits, five of which "consisted exclusively of slave states, with a population of a
little over eleven million, while the remaining four contained over sixteen and a half
million." Id The Supreme Court was affected by virtue of the tradition of drawing one
justice from (and to serve as circuit justice for) each circuit. Thus, the Supreme Court too
included a disproportionate number of justices from the South. Cf id. Meanwhile, "[e]ight
of the newer states, six of them free states, were not assigned to any circuit" and thus had
no representation on the Supreme Court. Id. The 1862 Act "reconstructed the judicial
system at the expense of the seceded [southern] states [, telescoping the five slave-state
circuits] into three." Id. at 61-62. The 1866 legislation set the size of the Supreme Court
and the number of circuits at nine, leaving only one circuit "composed exclusively of
former slave states [, while the] remaining slave states were appended to free ones." Id. at
62.
260. See Barrow & Walker, supra n. 18, at 32, 55-61 (linking struggle over division of
Fifth Circuit with civil rights conflicts).
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another. 26 1 Such political struggles, along with the desires of the
Presidents and Senators involved to preserve their preropatives
in the nomination and confirmation of federal judges, 26 make
any reform difficult to achieve. Reform proposals that
eventually led to the Evarts Act were under consideration in
Congress for at least a decade.26 3 The struggle to divide the old
Fifth Circuit took at least as long. 2 64 And discussions about
division of the Ninth Circuit date back to the early 1890s at
least.265
Given the difficulty of the task, it is perhaps not surprising
that Congress has taken no action with respect to the Ninth
Circuit despite the regular introduction of proposed legislation.
All recent proposals address the Ninth Circuit alone. Congress
appears to be stuck in the mindset that guided its first effort to
ameliorate caseload burdens in 1929: to restructure an existing
circuit only within its own boundaries. Congress's inclination
over recent decades to pursue a "patchwork" of "routine and
ordinary solutions" rather than "broad[er] and [more]
imaginative" reforms 266 suggests that lawmakers accept the
criteria for circuit structure propounded by the Commission on
revision of the Federal Appellate System in 1973. At the very
least, these criteria give Congress cover to do nothing. This
article argues that Congress should think more broadly about the
role and function of the courts of appeals. It outlines the major
themes that should shape any restructuring of the courts of
appeals that Congress may decide to undertake in the future.

261. See e.g. David S. Law, How to Rig the Federal Courts, 99 Geo. L.J. 779, 789, 789

nn. 37, 38 (2011) (citing additional sources); Stephan 0. Kline, Judicial Independence:
Rebuffing Congressional Attacks on the Third Branch, 87 Ky. L. J. 679, 777-81 (1998-99)

(discussing political motivations surrounding debate on splitting Ninth Circuit).
262. See e.g. 21 Cong. Rec. 10222-23 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Evarts) (discussing
political implications of creating many new circuit judgeships all at once).
263. 21 Cong. Rec. 3399 (remarks of Rep. Cannon) (1890). In fact, a bill proposing the
creation of intermediate appellate courts was introduced as early as 1866. Kutler, supra n.
79, at 55. The more pressing matter at the time was the size of the Supreme Court, which
went forward without the circuit court reform proposal. Id. at 55-56.
264. Barrow & Walker, supra n. 18, at 1-2 (describing "often bitter eighteen-year
controversy").
265. White Commission Report, supra n. 7, at 33 (noting that "[c]alls to split the Ninth
and other circuits have been heard since 1891").
266. Reinhardt, supra n. 12, at 1507.
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As I have argued elsewhere, Congress must determine the
proper balance between inferiority and uniformity of decision in
the courts of appeals. 267 Organization of the federal courts of
appeals into regional circuits still has some merit on the
inferiority ground. It may be difficult to devise a workable
structure for the federal appellate courts that preserves sufficient
inferiority to the Supreme Court while departing altogether from
regional organization. But adherence to the general concept of
regional circuits does not mean that Congress must maintain
inviolate the current boundaries. More importantly, it does not
follow from the general soundness of the regional structure that
each of the accepted criteria for circuit structure remains
appropriate or essential.
The real question for Congress is the necessary degree of
uniformity in the interpretation and application of federal law.
Congress could facilitate greater uniformity while respecting the
"inferiority" mandate by retaining the concept of regional
organization but revising it to reflect contemporary
demographics and other considerations. In so doing, Congress
should pay particular attention to the criteria that promote the
federal court objectives of supremacy and uniformity. Most
importantly, Congress should openly admit that any meaningful
reform will entail disruption in the short run.

267. See generally Dragich, Uniformity, supra n. 5, at 587-89.

